Third, structural coup proofing is also accompanied by the ancillary factor of
reduced quality of individual soldiers. The literature is rife with examples of
structural obstacles being accompanied by selective purges of the armed forces
(e.g., Horowitz 2002; Roessler 2011). Mobutu, for example, purged the ‘‘old
oligarchy,’’ with many being executed after the Mulamba affair (Kisangani
2000, 214). These included what Young and Turner (1985, 266) describe as
Mobutu’s ‘‘ablest soldiers.’’ Restocking the military would put ‘‘political considerations’’
over ‘‘military ones,’’ with promotions isolated to those with
‘‘enthusiasm for the existing regime’’ (Kisangani 2000, 215–16). Such efforts
undermine the quality of new recruits and reduce individual initiative (Pilster
and Bo¨hmelt 2011).