This study has attempted to discuss the concept of budgetary slack and the factors influencing budgetary slack building behavior. The study also discusses the theoretical foundation of truth-inducing schemes and their role in reducing budgetary slack. Most of the empirical studies have investigated single period truth- inducing schemes. A drawback of the single period schemes is that it ignore the Implications of long-term contracts. Long- term contracts may take into consideration the subordinate’s performance history. Therefore, in multiple period setting subordinate’s private
information regarding performance capabilities will be known to superiors. Such information can be incorporated into the compensation plan. The study suggests a model of truth-inducing in multiple period setting. The suggested scheme use subordinate performance over multiple periods as input in his compensation plan. This is expected to provide subordinate with an incentive to communicate truthfully, thereby reduce budgetary slack. In addition the suggested model motivate subordinate to exert his optimal effort because the reward scheme links his compensation to the performance.