The Industrial Organization literature investigates the product market deci-
sions of a firm while the corporate finance literature explores the financing
decisions of the firm. But the truth is both the financing decisions and the
product market decisions are interdependent and should be modeled together
to develop a better understanding of a firm's decisions. This thesis takes a
step in that direction.
The manager of a firm caters to the equity holders of the firm who are
protected by limited liability. Ex-ante debt is issued and at the time of
product market decision, debt is exogenous. The traditional product market
capital market interaction literature has argued that debt financing leads to
more aggressive product market strategies. If debt is treated as endogenous
and/or the switching state of nature is endogenous, it can be shown that debt
financing may lead to less aggressive product market strategies. Further, if
external financing consists of both debt and equity financing, it is shown that
a financially constrained firm shall produce less than what it would have pro-
duced if it was not financially constrained. Finally, managerial compensation
is reported to be one of the reasons for product market aggressiveness of a
firm in the context of product market capital market interaction.