Malaysia risk: Financial risk
(RiskWire Via Thomson Dialog NewsEdge) COUNTRY BRIEFING
FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT
RISK RATINGSCurrentCurrentPreviousPreviousRatingScoreRatingScoreOverall assessmentB35B35Financial riskB29B29Note: E=most risky; 100=most risky.SUMMARY
Bank Negar Malaysia (the central bank, BNM) abandoned a fixed exchange-rate system in favour of a managed float against a trade-weighted basket of currencies in July 2005. Since then the Malaysian ringgit has appreciated against the US dollar in an orderly fashion. In 2006 the ringgit appreciated by 3.6% against the US dollar. Given the huge importance of exports to the Malaysian economy, the BNM is likely to maintain the current exchange rate system until such a time as the authorities consider the economy to be sufficiently diversified. The capital market is being reformed under a ten-year plan, which aims to speed up the development of the corporate bond market. A systemic crisis in the banking sector appears unlikely. Since the 1997/98 financial crisis, the authorities have reorganised and strengthened the financial system, clearing out non-performing loans in addition to tighter regulatory rules and supervision.
SCENARIOS
The ringgit comes under pressure (Moderate Risk)
Following the decision in July 2005 by the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM, the central bank) to drop its ringgit:US dollar fixed exchange-rate regime in favour of a managed currency float against a basket of currencies, attention will be focused on how the ringgit performs, and on any clarification about the contents of the new basket. Our forecast assumes a steady but modest rise in the value of the ringgit against the US dollar, to an estimated average of M$3.59:US$1 in 2007 and firming further to M$3.54:US$1 in 2008. The ringgit is also vulnerable to movements in the yen (since Japan is Malaysia's main supplier, especially of parts and components) and the renminbi (as China has become an important market and competitor). Foreign firms should seek to reduce their exposure to the Malaysian ringgit by using hedging instruments.
Lack of depth in the financial market continues to restrain corporate finance (Low Risk)
Since the 1997-98 Asian crisis, the financial system and financial markets have undergone a period of intense structural change which is now almost completed. The government's goal has been to reduce the vulnerability of the economy to the vagaries of foreign financial flows by widening and deepening the financial markets, but this has yet to be fully achieved. At the same time, market regulation has been tightened, although questions remain about market supervision. Companies looking for finance in the Malaysian market for their Malaysian subsidiaries would be well advised to test the new environment for corporate finance, but should expect poor market liquidity.
BACKGROUND
(Updated: September 8th, 2006)
Financial Services
Malaysia has a well-developed financial sector. Banks (Bank Negara Malaysia, the central bank; commercial banks; finance companies; merchant banks and discount houses) account for two-thirds of the sector in terms of assets, and non-bank financial intermediaries (provident, pension and insurance funds; development finance institutions; savings institutions; and other financial intermediaries, such as unit trusts, building societies, leasing, factoring, and venture-capital companies) for one-third. Since the 1997-98 financial crisis the authorities have reorganised the financial system, tightened supervision and set long-term targets for the development of financial institutions and capital markets.
An unusual feature of the Malaysian financial sector is that financial institutions are required to provide loans at reasonable cost to priority sectorsall bumiputera organisations (those owned by ethnic Malays or other indigenous peoples), low-cost housing and small-scale enterprises. Lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is receiving particular attention, as the government is promoting the development of SMEs across all sectors to boost domestic investment and growth and to reduce dependence on large companies and global demand. A microfinancing scheme for micro-enterprises was established in 2003.
The 1997-98 financial crisis was a watershed for the financial sector, which was overextended and undermined by imprudent lending. During the decade before the crisis credit had expanded by an annual average of almost 30%, largely for property development and stockmarket investments. When the crisis hit and the economy turned downwards, non-performing loans (NPLs) soared, precipitating a serious banking crisis. The government played a more active role than in most other crisis-hit Asian countries in solving the bad-debt problem and restructuring the financial sector. This was virtually completed during 2003, with a small part of the total of recoverable NPLs still outstanding.
The government also used the financial crisis as an opportunity to push through the restructuring of the financial sector, the first stage of which was completed in June 2002. A major consolidation of the financial sector was considered necessary to ensure the emergence of strong, well-capitalised institutions capable of competing effectively in a globalised, deregulated environment. From 71 institutions before the Asian crisis, the merger programme resulted in ten domestic banking groups with 30 banking institutions. Under a ten-year Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP), published in March 2001, the first phase of development focused on the building of domestic banking capacity, which is closely monitored by the central bank. Further banking consolidation took place during 2004. The aim was to create a core of strong domestic players able to compete with foreign banks. In 2005 the FSMP moved to a second phase, focusing on liberalisation. Foreign institutions were encouraged to compete with domestic banks, and the 30% ownership limit of domestic banks was relaxed. Rules for the setting of interest rates were eased and the range of permitted financial products was expanded.
Malaysia has a sizeable, fast-growing Islamic banking sector, which at end-2004 accounted for 10.5% of banking system assets and 11.2% of deposits. Rapid expansion has been fostered by the introduction of new Islamic financial instruments, as well as by official promotion of Islamic banking and of Kuala Lumpur as a regional Islamic financial centre. The FSMP has set a target for Islamic banking to account for 20% of banking assets by 2010.
The capital market, comprising the equity and bond markets, is gaining renewed importance as a source of financing, especially for the private sector. The equity market in particular was badly hurt during the 1997-98 financial crisis by the governments imposition of currency and capital controls, and by bail-outs of politically well-connected entrepreneurs to the detriment of minority shareholders. Undaunted, in February 2001 the government published a ten-year Capital Market Master Plan (CMP), to establish an internationally competitive capital market. The major objectives of the first, foundation-building phase were to strengthen corporate governance and surveillance, to develop a broad corporate bond market, to make fundraising more efficient and reduce transaction costs, to unite the existing exchanges and to boost the liquidity of the stockmarket. The second phase of the CMP started in 2004 and involves liberalisation of stockbroking and investment management, removal of structural impediments to market access, deregulation, enhancing secondary-market liquidity and allowing greater international participation in the domestic capital market. The changes in part reflect the fact that, since the Asian financial crisis, Malaysia has had excess savings that it needs to invest abroad.
Foreign Reserves and the Exchange Rate
Malaysia has carefully preserved its foreign reserves during the past five years. During the 1997-98 balance-of-payments crisis, large outflows of non-resident short-term capital and intervention to support the exchange rate of the ringgit reduced foreign-exchange reserves from M$70bn at end-1996 to M$59.1bn at end-1997, but capital controls quickly led to the rebuilding of reserves to M$99.4bn at the end of 1998.
At the end of August 2005 the central banks international reserves stood at M$304.3bn, compared with M$170.5bn at end-2003 and M$131.4bn at end-2002. The acceleration in the build-up of foreign reserves, in recent years, has been caused by a number of factors. It reflects the repatriation of export earnings, which was also evident in the record levels of the trade and current-account surpluses. The reserves accumulation was caused by FDI inflows as well as inflows of portfolio funds; together, the inflows more than offset payments for services and external loan repayments. Portfolio inflows, in particular, have been swollen by funds speculating on a rise in the external value of the ringgit.
In July 2005 the BNM replaced the ringgit:US dollar peg, which was fixed at M$3.80:US$1 during the 1997-98 Asian crisis, with a managed float of the ringgit against a trade-weighted index of currencies of Malaysias major trading partners. Shortly before, Chinas government declared that it had replaced its renminbi peg with the US dollar with a managed floating exchange-rate system. The BNM stated that, because of changes in the international and regional financial and economic environment, it was important for Malaysia to have a stable exchange rate against its major trading partners and, in particular, other countries in the region. By adopting a managed float against a trade-weighted basket of currencies, the BNM is, effectively, returning to the currency management that existed between 1971 and September 1998. Under the new system, ringgit short-selling, ringgit trading overseas, and ringgit lending to non-residents contin
Malaysia risk: Financial risk
(RiskWire Via Thomson Dialog NewsEdge) COUNTRY BRIEFING
FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT
RISK RATINGSCurrentCurrentPreviousPreviousRatingScoreRatingScoreOverall assessmentB35B35Financial riskB29B29Note: E=most risky; 100=most risky.SUMMARY
Bank Negar Malaysia (the central bank, BNM) abandoned a fixed exchange-rate system in favour of a managed float against a trade-weighted basket of currencies in July 2005. Since then the Malaysian ringgit has appreciated against the US dollar in an orderly fashion. In 2006 the ringgit appreciated by 3.6% against the US dollar. Given the huge importance of exports to the Malaysian economy, the BNM is likely to maintain the current exchange rate system until such a time as the authorities consider the economy to be sufficiently diversified. The capital market is being reformed under a ten-year plan, which aims to speed up the development of the corporate bond market. A systemic crisis in the banking sector appears unlikely. Since the 1997/98 financial crisis, the authorities have reorganised and strengthened the financial system, clearing out non-performing loans in addition to tighter regulatory rules and supervision.
SCENARIOS
The ringgit comes under pressure (Moderate Risk)
Following the decision in July 2005 by the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM, the central bank) to drop its ringgit:US dollar fixed exchange-rate regime in favour of a managed currency float against a basket of currencies, attention will be focused on how the ringgit performs, and on any clarification about the contents of the new basket. Our forecast assumes a steady but modest rise in the value of the ringgit against the US dollar, to an estimated average of M$3.59:US$1 in 2007 and firming further to M$3.54:US$1 in 2008. The ringgit is also vulnerable to movements in the yen (since Japan is Malaysia's main supplier, especially of parts and components) and the renminbi (as China has become an important market and competitor). Foreign firms should seek to reduce their exposure to the Malaysian ringgit by using hedging instruments.
Lack of depth in the financial market continues to restrain corporate finance (Low Risk)
Since the 1997-98 Asian crisis, the financial system and financial markets have undergone a period of intense structural change which is now almost completed. The government's goal has been to reduce the vulnerability of the economy to the vagaries of foreign financial flows by widening and deepening the financial markets, but this has yet to be fully achieved. At the same time, market regulation has been tightened, although questions remain about market supervision. Companies looking for finance in the Malaysian market for their Malaysian subsidiaries would be well advised to test the new environment for corporate finance, but should expect poor market liquidity.
BACKGROUND
(Updated: September 8th, 2006)
Financial Services
Malaysia has a well-developed financial sector. Banks (Bank Negara Malaysia, the central bank; commercial banks; finance companies; merchant banks and discount houses) account for two-thirds of the sector in terms of assets, and non-bank financial intermediaries (provident, pension and insurance funds; development finance institutions; savings institutions; and other financial intermediaries, such as unit trusts, building societies, leasing, factoring, and venture-capital companies) for one-third. Since the 1997-98 financial crisis the authorities have reorganised the financial system, tightened supervision and set long-term targets for the development of financial institutions and capital markets.
An unusual feature of the Malaysian financial sector is that financial institutions are required to provide loans at reasonable cost to priority sectorsall bumiputera organisations (those owned by ethnic Malays or other indigenous peoples), low-cost housing and small-scale enterprises. Lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is receiving particular attention, as the government is promoting the development of SMEs across all sectors to boost domestic investment and growth and to reduce dependence on large companies and global demand. A microfinancing scheme for micro-enterprises was established in 2003.
The 1997-98 financial crisis was a watershed for the financial sector, which was overextended and undermined by imprudent lending. During the decade before the crisis credit had expanded by an annual average of almost 30%, largely for property development and stockmarket investments. When the crisis hit and the economy turned downwards, non-performing loans (NPLs) soared, precipitating a serious banking crisis. The government played a more active role than in most other crisis-hit Asian countries in solving the bad-debt problem and restructuring the financial sector. This was virtually completed during 2003, with a small part of the total of recoverable NPLs still outstanding.
The government also used the financial crisis as an opportunity to push through the restructuring of the financial sector, the first stage of which was completed in June 2002. A major consolidation of the financial sector was considered necessary to ensure the emergence of strong, well-capitalised institutions capable of competing effectively in a globalised, deregulated environment. From 71 institutions before the Asian crisis, the merger programme resulted in ten domestic banking groups with 30 banking institutions. Under a ten-year Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP), published in March 2001, the first phase of development focused on the building of domestic banking capacity, which is closely monitored by the central bank. Further banking consolidation took place during 2004. The aim was to create a core of strong domestic players able to compete with foreign banks. In 2005 the FSMP moved to a second phase, focusing on liberalisation. Foreign institutions were encouraged to compete with domestic banks, and the 30% ownership limit of domestic banks was relaxed. Rules for the setting of interest rates were eased and the range of permitted financial products was expanded.
Malaysia has a sizeable, fast-growing Islamic banking sector, which at end-2004 accounted for 10.5% of banking system assets and 11.2% of deposits. Rapid expansion has been fostered by the introduction of new Islamic financial instruments, as well as by official promotion of Islamic banking and of Kuala Lumpur as a regional Islamic financial centre. The FSMP has set a target for Islamic banking to account for 20% of banking assets by 2010.
The capital market, comprising the equity and bond markets, is gaining renewed importance as a source of financing, especially for the private sector. The equity market in particular was badly hurt during the 1997-98 financial crisis by the governments imposition of currency and capital controls, and by bail-outs of politically well-connected entrepreneurs to the detriment of minority shareholders. Undaunted, in February 2001 the government published a ten-year Capital Market Master Plan (CMP), to establish an internationally competitive capital market. The major objectives of the first, foundation-building phase were to strengthen corporate governance and surveillance, to develop a broad corporate bond market, to make fundraising more efficient and reduce transaction costs, to unite the existing exchanges and to boost the liquidity of the stockmarket. The second phase of the CMP started in 2004 and involves liberalisation of stockbroking and investment management, removal of structural impediments to market access, deregulation, enhancing secondary-market liquidity and allowing greater international participation in the domestic capital market. The changes in part reflect the fact that, since the Asian financial crisis, Malaysia has had excess savings that it needs to invest abroad.
Foreign Reserves and the Exchange Rate
Malaysia has carefully preserved its foreign reserves during the past five years. During the 1997-98 balance-of-payments crisis, large outflows of non-resident short-term capital and intervention to support the exchange rate of the ringgit reduced foreign-exchange reserves from M$70bn at end-1996 to M$59.1bn at end-1997, but capital controls quickly led to the rebuilding of reserves to M$99.4bn at the end of 1998.
At the end of August 2005 the central banks international reserves stood at M$304.3bn, compared with M$170.5bn at end-2003 and M$131.4bn at end-2002. The acceleration in the build-up of foreign reserves, in recent years, has been caused by a number of factors. It reflects the repatriation of export earnings, which was also evident in the record levels of the trade and current-account surpluses. The reserves accumulation was caused by FDI inflows as well as inflows of portfolio funds; together, the inflows more than offset payments for services and external loan repayments. Portfolio inflows, in particular, have been swollen by funds speculating on a rise in the external value of the ringgit.
In July 2005 the BNM replaced the ringgit:US dollar peg, which was fixed at M$3.80:US$1 during the 1997-98 Asian crisis, with a managed float of the ringgit against a trade-weighted index of currencies of Malaysias major trading partners. Shortly before, Chinas government declared that it had replaced its renminbi peg with the US dollar with a managed floating exchange-rate system. The BNM stated that, because of changes in the international and regional financial and economic environment, it was important for Malaysia to have a stable exchange rate against its major trading partners and, in particular, other countries in the region. By adopting a managed float against a trade-weighted basket of currencies, the BNM is, effectively, returning to the currency management that existed between 1971 and September 1998. Under the new system, ringgit short-selling, ringgit trading overseas, and ringgit lending to non-residents contin
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