Understood in this way, having a desire is like having an addiction. Smoking a
cigarette alleviates the craving for a cigarette, but it does not enhance the quality
of a smoker’s life. Ignoring the health risks of a tobacco habit, smokers are not
better off than non-smokers because they satisfy more cravings. They would be
better off without these cravings. And, in general, the satisfaction of a desire
doesn’t add anything to our lives; it simply fills a void. If the ideal state of being is
a state of “fullness,” and if satisfying a desire simply amounts to filling a void,
then clearly we are no better off as a result of having a desire satisfied than we
would have been if we never had the desire.
According to this account, the satisfaction of a desire is not a genuine benefit;
it does not enhance the quality of our lives. It might be compared to recovering
from an illness. It is good to recover from an illness, but it is better never to be sick.
The ideal state of being is to be healthy, and recovering from an illness is a good
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thing only because it restores us to that state. The satisfaction of a desire is a good
thing in exactly the same way: it restores us to health, to tranquility, to fullness.
This is not obviously true, however, for it certainly seems that there is more to
the satisfaction of a desire than the alleviation of dissatisfaction. It is an enjoyable
experience to drink when you’re thirsty and to eat when you’re hungry. If you
never experienced thirst or hunger, you would never have these enjoyments.
Don’t these enjoyments enhance the quality of your life? It is said that Diogenes
of Sinope, the stoic philosopher, would deliberately prolong his experience of
hunger and thirst so that he could more fully appreciate the joys of eating and
drinking. Other stoic philosophers have advised us to voluntarily endure certain
discomforts (such as being cold and wet) so that we might better appreciate
simple comforts (such as being warm and dry).4