accounting choices during import relief investigations, even if it requires
them to waive or amend covenants that are violated,17 since the financial
performance of the firm can be expected to improve if import relief is
granted. Managers would also benefit from obtaining import relief if the
future earnings of the firm are higher than without the relief and higher
ave equal incentives to manage earnings during import relief investi-
gations. The ITC evaluates the overall results of the industry but does
not require that all firms be injured in order to recommend import relief;
therefore, the managers of some domestic producers may decide that the
results of their operations will not alter the ITC's ultimate decision and,
consequently, they may not manage earnings during import relief inves-
tigations. Of course, if a large number of managers adopted this attitude,
then, as a group, they could potentially affect the ITC's ultimate decision.
Also, some firms may not decrease reported earnings during import relief
investigations because their management compensation and/or debt cov-
enant incentives to manage earnings upward override the import relief
incentive.
In order to address the free-rider problem, a supplemental test of the
earnings management hypothesis restricts the sample to firms that
petitione