We may then require of states that they respect and provide justice. Suppose that we say that a state is justified in so far as it is just (and efficient). Now it may be that no state is, or could be, thereby justified. Individuals have rights So strong and far reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its otiicials may do. How much room do individual rights leave for the states?" (Nozick, 1974: ix). It may be that the of justice are such as to fill up all of moral space or at least leave no room for the state's exercise of its functions or even for its existence. For instance, should we possess indefeasible (or virtually indefeasible) natural rights to (our) life, (our) libcity, and (our) then it is doubt ful that the state may do very much, if anything, without violating our (moral) rights. Natural rights -rights which are held by virtue of the possessor's nature seem to constrain states by requiring them to secure the consent of the gov erned. This is, in effect, to assume that rights protect choices. It is now common in the literature on rights distinguish between choice (or will) accounts and interest (or benefit) accounts. The latter understand rights to be protected interests or benefits, where the former conceive of them as protecting choices. In one case, the correlative duties protect interests or guarantee benefits, the other the duties (and accompanying powers) protect choices. Consent would effect (limited) alienation or suspension of our rights and thus be a condition,of justified state interference. However, it may be that our funda mental rights are best construed as protecting inter ests or benefits. On this interpretation they would not block stat:s, at least as easily as choice-protecting