We study the effects of labor mobility within a currency union suffering from nominal rigidities. When the demand shortfall in depressed region is mostly internal, migration may not help regional macroeconomic adjustment. When external demand is also at the root of the problem, migration out of depressed regions may produce a posi- tive spillover for stayers. We consider a planning problem and compare its solution to the equilibrium. We find that the equilibrium is generally constrained inefficient, although the welfare losses may be small if the economy suffers mainly from internal demand imbalances.
Mundell (1961) is famously cited for his exaltation of labor mobility as a precondition for optimal currency areas. This idea, which quickly settled as a cornerstone of the growing Optimal Currency Area (OCA) literature, seems broadly consistent with the preciously few experiences we have to date. The United States enjoys relatively high mobility and has proven to be a successful currency union. Mobility is arguably much lower within the Eurozone, which sunk into trouble scarcely ten years after its inauguration.
For useful comments and discussions we thank Arnaud Costinot, Thomas Philippon and Robert Shimer, as well as seminar participants at MIT and the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
1See Dellas and Tavlas (2009) for a review of the OCA literature. Important precedents to Mundell (1961) are Friedman (1953), Meade (1957), and Scitovsky (1958). Mundell emphasized that labor mobility may be imperfect across regions within national borders, so that this OCA condition may not hold even for a single country, thereby weakening Friedman’s argument for flexible exchange rates at the national level.
For example, according to Bonin et al. (2008) annual interstate mobility in the US was 2-2.5% in 2005 and 2006, while cross-border moves within Europe are around 0.1%.
The OCA literature has isolated other factors for a union’s success, including fiscal and product market integration, which also differ between the US and the Eurozone.
Intuitive as Mundell’s notion may be, we know of no formal study connecting mobility with macroeconomic adjustment within a currency union. To remedy this, we set up a currency union model featuring nominal rigidities and incorporate labor mobility across the different regions (or countries) that compose the currency union. We use this simple model to tackle two related questions. First, does mobility help stabilize macroeconomic conditions across regions in a union? Second, is equilibrium mobility socially optimal?
Our findings do not fully validate the Mundellian view, but they are consistent with a potential important role for mobility. Workers migrating away from depressed regions naturally benefit from the option to pick up and go somewhere better. The interesting and less obvious question is whether their exodus also helps those that stay behind. That is, whether it aids in the macroeconomic adjustment of regions. A major insight of our analysis is that the answer to this question is subtle because workers leaving a region depart not only with their labor, but also with their purchasing power.
Indeed, we provide a benchmark case where migration has no effect on the per capita allocations across regions. For this benchmark, the entire demand shortfall in depressed regions is internal, located within the non-tradable sector. When workers migrate out of a depressed region local labor supply is reduced, but so is the demand non-traded goods, which, in turn, lowers the demand for labor. The two effects cancel, leaving the situation for stayers unchanged.
Away from this neutral benchmark, depressed regions might also suffer from external demand shortfalls. When this is the case, migration out of depressed regions may help improve the region’s macroeconomic outcome. For example, at the opposite end of the spectrum, suppose regions only produce traded goods and that there is no home bias in the demand for these goods. The demand for each region’s product is then determined entirely by external demand at the union level, and internal demand plays no special role. In this case, migration out of a depressed region improves the outcome of stayers by increasing their employment, income and consumption.
Overall, these results highlight that the macroeconomic spillover benefits from mobilty are not straightforward. In particular, the degree of economic openness (how much regions trade with one another) turns out to be a key parameter. Openness was proposed by McKinnon (1963) as another precondition for an optimal currency area. Our findings thus reveal an interesting interaction between these two separate notions discussed in the OCA literature.
Turning to the second, normative, question we find that the equilibrium with free mobility is not generally constrained efficient. Typically, there is too little mobility from a social welfare perspective
เราศึกษาผลกระทบของการเคลื่อนไหวแรงงานภายในสหภาพสกุลที่ทุกข์ทรมานจาก rigidities ระบุ เมื่อกรณีอุปสงค์ในภูมิภาคตกอยู่ภายในส่วนใหญ่ โยกย้ายอาจไม่ช่วยปรับปรุงเศรษฐกิจมหภาคระดับภูมิภาค เมื่อความต้องการภายนอกเป็นที่รากของปัญหา ย้ายจากภูมิภาคที่ตกอาจผลิต spillover posi tive สำหรับเปิด เราพิจารณาปัญหาวางแผน และการเปรียบเทียบการแก้ไขสมดุล เราพบว่า สมดุลได้โดยทั่วไปจำกัดต่ำ แม้ว่าการสูญเสียสวัสดิการอาจถ้าเศรษฐกิจ suffers จากความไม่สมดุลของความต้องการภายในส่วนใหญ่ซึ่งมีการอ้างถึง Mundell (1961) สำหรับเขา exaltation เคลื่อนไหวแรงงานเป็นเงื่อนไขการสกุลเงินที่เหมาะสม ความคิดนี้ ซึ่งชำระเป็นรากฐานของวรรณกรรมที่ตั้งสกุลเงินสูงสุด (OCA) เติบโตอย่างรวดเร็ว ดูเหมือนทั่วไปสอดคล้องกับประสบการณ์ไม่กี่ preciously ที่มีวัน สหรัฐอเมริกาตลอดการเคลื่อนไหวค่อนข้างสูง และได้พิสูจน์ให้ สหภาพสกุลประสบความสำเร็จ เห็นว่าต่ำกว่ามากในยูโรโซน ซึ่งจมลงในปัญหาแทบสิบปีหลังจากของนอก ได้ความคิดเห็นที่เป็นประโยชน์และสนทนา เราขอบคุณ Arnaud Costinot, Thomas Philippon และโรเบิร์ต Shimer ตลอดจนผู้เข้าร่วมสัมมนาที่ MIT และธนาคารกลางของแอตแลนต้า1See Dellas and Tavlas (2009) for a review of the OCA literature. Important precedents to Mundell (1961) are Friedman (1953), Meade (1957), and Scitovsky (1958). Mundell emphasized that labor mobility may be imperfect across regions within national borders, so that this OCA condition may not hold even for a single country, thereby weakening Friedman’s argument for flexible exchange rates at the national level.For example, according to Bonin et al. (2008) annual interstate mobility in the US was 2-2.5% in 2005 and 2006, while cross-border moves within Europe are around 0.1%.The OCA literature has isolated other factors for a union’s success, including fiscal and product market integration, which also differ between the US and the Eurozone.Intuitive as Mundell’s notion may be, we know of no formal study connecting mobility with macroeconomic adjustment within a currency union. To remedy this, we set up a currency union model featuring nominal rigidities and incorporate labor mobility across the different regions (or countries) that compose the currency union. We use this simple model to tackle two related questions. First, does mobility help stabilize macroeconomic conditions across regions in a union? Second, is equilibrium mobility socially optimal?Our findings do not fully validate the Mundellian view, but they are consistent with a potential important role for mobility. Workers migrating away from depressed regions naturally benefit from the option to pick up and go somewhere better. The interesting and less obvious question is whether their exodus also helps those that stay behind. That is, whether it aids in the macroeconomic adjustment of regions. A major insight of our analysis is that the answer to this question is subtle because workers leaving a region depart not only with their labor, but also with their purchasing power.Indeed, we provide a benchmark case where migration has no effect on the per capita allocations across regions. For this benchmark, the entire demand shortfall in depressed regions is internal, located within the non-tradable sector. When workers migrate out of a depressed region local labor supply is reduced, but so is the demand non-traded goods, which, in turn, lowers the demand for labor. The two effects cancel, leaving the situation for stayers unchanged.Away from this neutral benchmark, depressed regions might also suffer from external demand shortfalls. When this is the case, migration out of depressed regions may help improve the region’s macroeconomic outcome. For example, at the opposite end of the spectrum, suppose regions only produce traded goods and that there is no home bias in the demand for these goods. The demand for each region’s product is then determined entirely by external demand at the union level, and internal demand plays no special role. In this case, migration out of a depressed region improves the outcome of stayers by increasing their employment, income and consumption.Overall, these results highlight that the macroeconomic spillover benefits from mobilty are not straightforward. In particular, the degree of economic openness (how much regions trade with one another) turns out to be a key parameter. Openness was proposed by McKinnon (1963) as another precondition for an optimal currency area. Our findings thus reveal an interesting interaction between these two separate notions discussed in the OCA literature.Turning to the second, normative, question we find that the equilibrium with free mobility is not generally constrained efficient. Typically, there is too little mobility from a social welfare perspective
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