Similarly, as the Korean crisis was unfolding in mid-November 1997, the Korean won repeatedly
declined by its daily limit even after than limit was relaxed. Th e fi nance minister recommended to outgoing
Korean president Kim Young Sam that Korea should approach the IMF for fi nancial support. He was
promptly fi red. Th e next day, after a meeting in Manila, Timothy Geithner and I arrived in Seoul to check
out the situation. We met with Lee Kyung Shik, the governor of the Bank of Korea. He explained to us
that most of Korea’s announced reserves of more than $20 billion were in illiquid deposits at Korean banks
31. By way of illustration, Park et al. (2013) report maximum pseudo r-squares of 0.20 on empirical predictions of the
global fi nancial crisis and maximum adjusted r-squares of 0.50 on the depth of crisis in terms of lost GDP.17
that over the previous six months had lost their access to international interbank liquidity.32 We asked why
the newly designated fi nance minister had accepted the job. Governor Lee’s response was that he had not
yet seen the books. Two days later, on November 22, President Kim announced that Korea would seek IMF
support for a reform program
Similarly, as the Korean crisis was unfolding in mid-November 1997, the Korean won repeatedly
declined by its daily limit even after than limit was relaxed. Th e fi nance minister recommended to outgoing
Korean president Kim Young Sam that Korea should approach the IMF for fi nancial support. He was
promptly fi red. Th e next day, after a meeting in Manila, Timothy Geithner and I arrived in Seoul to check
out the situation. We met with Lee Kyung Shik, the governor of the Bank of Korea. He explained to us
that most of Korea’s announced reserves of more than $20 billion were in illiquid deposits at Korean banks
31. By way of illustration, Park et al. (2013) report maximum pseudo r-squares of 0.20 on empirical predictions of the
global fi nancial crisis and maximum adjusted r-squares of 0.50 on the depth of crisis in terms of lost GDP.17
that over the previous six months had lost their access to international interbank liquidity.32 We asked why
the newly designated fi nance minister had accepted the job. Governor Lee’s response was that he had not
yet seen the books. Two days later, on November 22, President Kim announced that Korea would seek IMF
support for a reform program
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