The first fundamental welfare theorem says that competitive markets with
no externalities yield a Pareto-efficient outcome. But the standard model of
perfect competition, where large numbers of buyers and sellers engage in trade
without transactions costs, has some deficiencies as a model for credit markets,
both in theory and in practice. The waters are muddied in credit markets by
the issue of repayment, because a debtor may be unable to repay (for instance,
if he is hit by a shock such as bad weather or a fire), or unwilling to repay (if
the lender has insufficient sanctions against delinquent borrowers). For the latter
contingency, credit markets require a framework of legal enforcement. But
if the costs of enforcement are too high, a lender may simply cease to lenda
situation that may well arise for poor farmers in developing countries
The first fundamental welfare theorem says that competitive markets withno externalities yield a Pareto-efficient outcome. But the standard model ofperfect competition, where large numbers of buyers and sellers engage in tradewithout transactions costs, has some deficiencies as a model for credit markets,both in theory and in practice. The waters are muddied in credit markets bythe issue of repayment, because a debtor may be unable to repay (for instance,if he is hit by a shock such as bad weather or a fire), or unwilling to repay (ifthe lender has insufficient sanctions against delinquent borrowers). For the lattercontingency, credit markets require a framework of legal enforcement. Butif the costs of enforcement are too high, a lender may simply cease to lendasituation that may well arise for poor farmers in developing countries
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