Yet, on the second alternative, where oak and acorn are regarded as two completely different things, which exist in complete independence from each other (as is
implied by svabhāva), then there is no way that either could cause the other.
The argument holds even if we regard the oak as being caused by something entirely
different, such as the gardener. A well-known version of the argument in Western
philosophy involves a similar concept of matter and mind as completely independent
from each other, which gives rise to the problem of how a change in one could cause a
change in the other.
A further consequence is that if two completely separate and unrelated things could somehow be cause and effect, then this would imply that anything could give rise to anything at all.
For instance, we might plant an acorn, and end up with an orange tree! Clearly, there has to be some sort of relation between a cause and an effect.
The third option, being a combination of the first two, is rejected for the same
reasons (Hopkins 1996,58)(((This might seem a little too quick, for saying that the oak and acorn are both the same and different, or else, say that the oak is caused by itself (the acorn) and another (the gardener) might seem like the most plausible account. Oak and acorn are different, to the extent that they succeed each other in time, and therefore, in reply to the objections against self-causation, we could reject the claim that acorn and oak are identical, and exist simultaneously. On the other hand, they are not completely separate and unrelated either, and therefore we can answer the objections against causation by another, by allowing them to be
"the same" to the extent that they are different stages of the same entity and related as cause and effect.
However, Nāgārjuna‘s concept of svabhāva cannot allow such complex individuals. An entity with svabhāva must be irreducible, and therefore, it cannot be divided into different temporal stages. If we choose one of these stages and call it 'the tree' then this must be independent from everything else, and cannot be related to the acorn stage. Moreover, its essential properties cannot change, so there cannot be
one entity with svabhāva that is both tree and acorn. This shows, of course, that a tree cannot possibly be a candidate for svabhāva, and that the arguments are best applied to simple entities, such as atoms, or properties. In any case, though, when we think of things in terms of svabhāva we cannot posit causation between them, for svabhāva implies that they are independent, and cannot be related.))).The fourth amounts to a negation of causation altogether,and is refuted through experience, that is, through the fact that things do seem to be related through causality (Westerhoff 2009, 112).