By contrast, a Soviet Foreign Ministry statement in mid- August was notably conciliatory in tone. Then the dispatch
of a United Nations fact-finding mission i n Laos i n September prompted a stronger Soviet stand calling for a new Geneva Con- ference t o uphold the legality of the 1954 agreements. This action, promptly endorsed by Hanoi and Peiping, succeeded temporarily in reconciling the divergent views of the three bloc partners. Two developments in the following month, how- ever, suggested a continuing dispute over the tactical line
to be pursued inLaos.
The first indication appeared in Khrushchev's obvious effort to minamize the gravity of the Laotian situation in a major foreign policy address of 31 October. In a formulation remarkably neutral in tone, the Soviet leader urged Ifthe great powers" to refrain from intervention in Laos and argued that
a "sensible approach'' predicated on adherence to "internirtional agreements" could "1iquidate the clashes" in that troubled
area. And in a final observation which appeared to be directed in part at the incendiary and bellicose position of Communist China throughout the precedingmonths, Khrushchev asserted that "more than a necessary amount of noise has been raised
in the world" about the Laotian cirsis.
. .
The second development concerned a Soviet approach to the British in behalf of the imprisoned Communist leaders about
to go on trial in Laos. During the course of conversations
in London, Soviet Ambassador Malik referred twice to Communist China's position as expressed in a 31 October note which warned that the trials would "inevitably block the way to a peaceful solution" of the Laotian problem. By this device the Soviet representative appeared to convey a warning that the Chinese
would cause trouble in Laos if the trials were held. Moreover, the timing of this demarche, which followed almost immediately Khrushchev's thinly-veiled warning in Peiping against "test-
ing the stability of the capitalist system by force," suggested the possibility of Soviet apprehension over Communist China*s aggressive intentions i n Southeast Asia.
IV. NORTH VIETNAM AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE: 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 6 1
A number of developments in the f a l l of 1959 intensified the Sino-Soviet dispute over methods of building Communism and international Communist strategy. Following his abortive
By contrast, a Soviet Foreign Ministry statement in mid- August was notably conciliatory in tone. Then the dispatchof a United Nations fact-finding mission i n Laos i n September prompted a stronger Soviet stand calling for a new Geneva Con- ference t o uphold the legality of the 1954 agreements. This action, promptly endorsed by Hanoi and Peiping, succeeded temporarily in reconciling the divergent views of the three bloc partners. Two developments in the following month, how- ever, suggested a continuing dispute over the tactical lineto be pursued inLaos.The first indication appeared in Khrushchev's obvious effort to minamize the gravity of the Laotian situation in a major foreign policy address of 31 October. In a formulation remarkably neutral in tone, the Soviet leader urged Ifthe great powers" to refrain from intervention in Laos and argued thata "sensible approach'' predicated on adherence to "internirtional agreements" could "1iquidate the clashes" in that troubledarea. And in a final observation which appeared to be directed in part at the incendiary and bellicose position of Communist China throughout the precedingmonths, Khrushchev asserted that "more than a necessary amount of noise has been raisedin the world" about the Laotian cirsis.. .The second development concerned a Soviet approach to the British in behalf of the imprisoned Communist leaders aboutto go on trial in Laos. During the course of conversationsในลอนดอน มาลิคแอมบาสเดอร์โซเวียตเรียกสองตำแหน่งของจีนคอมมิวนิสต์ ตามหมายเหตุ 31 ตุลาคมซึ่งเตือนว่า การทดลองจะ "ย่อมบล็อกวิธีการแก้ปัญหาที่ดี" ของลาว โดยอุปกรณ์นี้ ตัวแทนฝ่ายโซเวียตปรากฏเพื่อ แสดงคำเตือนที่จีนจะเกิดปัญหาในลาวถ้าทดลองจัดให้มีขึ้น นอกจากนี้ เวลาของ demarche นี้ ซึ่งเกือบจะทันทีตามกิตาครุสชอฟของประปราย-veiled เตือนใน Peiping กับ "ทดสอบ-เสถียรภาพของระบบทุนแรง กำลัง"แนะนำของโซเวียตเข้าใจมากกว่าจีนคอมมิวนิสต์ * s ก้าวร้าวความตั้งใจผมเอ็นเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้IV. เวียดนามเหนือและข้อโต้แย้งจีน-โซเวียต: 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 6 1จำนวนในการ f l l ของ 1959 intensified ข้อโต้แย้งจีน-โซเวียตมากกว่าวิธีการสร้างคอมมิวนิสต์และประเทศคอมมิวนิสต์กลยุทธ์ ต่อเขา abortive
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