8.8 In a further submission dated 3 July 1996 the State party explains the purposes pursued by the Act of 13 July 1990. It points out that the introduction of the Act was in fact intended to serve the struggle against anti-semitism. In this context the State party refers to a statement made
by the then Minister of Justice, Mr. Arpaillange, before the Senate characterizing the denial of the existence of the Holocaust as the contemporary expression of racism and anti-semitism.
8.9 In his comments of 11 July 1996 made on the State party's submission the author reiterates his earlier arguments; inter alia he again challenges the "accepted" version of the extermination of the Jews, because of its lack of evidence. In this context he refers for example to the fact that a decree ordering the extermination has never been found, and it has never been proven how it was technically possible to kill so many people by gas-asphyxiation. He further recalls that visitors to Auschwitz have been made to believe that the gas chamber they see there is authentic, whereas the authorities know that it is a reconstruction, built on a different spot than the original is said to have been. He concludes that as a historian, interested in the facts, he is not willing to accept the traditional version of events and has no choice but to contest it.
Examination of the merits
9.1 The Human Rights Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as it is required to do under article 5, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol.
9.2 The Committee takes note of public debates in France, including negative comments made by French parliamentarians on the Gayssot Act, as well as of arguments put forward in other, mainly European, countries which support and oppose the introduction of similar legislations.
9.3 Although it does not contest that the application of the terms of the Gayssot Act, which, in their effect, make it a criminal offence to challenge the conclusions and the verdict of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, may lead, under different conditions than the facts of the instant case, to decisions or measures incompatible with the Covenant, the Committee is not called upon to criticize in the abstract laws enacted by States parties. The task of the Committee under the Optional Protocol is to ascertain whether the conditions of the restrictions imposed on the right to freedom of expression are met in the communications which are brought before it.
9.4 Any restriction on the right to freedom of expression must cumulatively meet the following conditions: it must be provided by law, it must address one of the aims set out in paragraph 3 (a) and (b) of article 19, and must be necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose.
9.5 The restriction on the author's freedom of expression was indeed provided by law i.e. the Act of 13 July 1990. It is the constant jurisprudence of the Committee that the restrictive law itself must be in compliance with the provisions of the Covenant. In this regard the Committee concludes, on the basis of the reading of the judgment of the 17th Chambre correctionnelle du Tribunal de grande instance de Paris that the finding of the author's guilt was based on his following two statements: "... I have excellent reasons not to believe in the policy of extermination of Jews or in the magic gas chambers ... I wish to see that 100 per cent of the French citizens realize that the myth of the gas chambers is a dishonest fabrication". His conviction therefore did not encroach upon his right to hold and express an opinion in general, rather the court convicted Mr. Faurisson for having violated the rights and reputation of others. For these reasons the Committee is satisfied that the Gayssot Act, as read, interpreted and applied to the author's case by the French courts, is in compliance with the provisions of the Covenant.
9.6 To assess whether the restrictions placed on the author's freedom of expression by his criminal conviction were applied for the purposes provided for by the Covenant, the Committee begins by noting, as it did in its General Comment 10 that the rights for the protection of which restrictions on the freedom of expression are permitted by article 19, paragraph 3, may relate to the interests of other persons or to those of the community as a whole. Since the statements made by the author, read in their full context, were of a nature as to raise or strengthen anti-semitic feelings, the restriction served the respect of the Jewish community to live free from fear of an atmosphere of anti-semitism. The Committee therefore concludes that the restriction of the author's freedom of expression was permissible under article 19, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant.
9.7 Lastly the Committee needs to consider whether the restriction of the author's freedom of expression was necessary. The Committee noted the State party's argument contending that the introduction of the Gayssot Act was intended to serve the struggle against racism and anti-semitism. It also noted the statement of a member of the French Government, the then Minister of Justice, which characterized the denial of the existence of the Holocaust as the principal vehicle for anti-semitism. In the absence in the material before it of any argument undermining the validity of the State party's position as to the necessity of the restriction, the Committee is satisfied that the restriction of Mr. Faurisson's freedom of expression was necessary within the meaning of article 19, paragraph 3, of the Covenant.
10. The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is of the view that the facts as found by the Committee do not reveal a violation by France of article 19, paragraph 3, of the Covenant.
[Adopted in English, French and Spanish, the English text being the original version. Subsequently to be issued also in Arabic, Chinese and Russian as part of the Committee's annual report to the General Assembly.]
8.8 ในส่งต่อวัน 3 1996 กรกฎาคมสถานะบุคคลอธิบายถึงวัตถุประสงค์ในการติดตาม โดยพระราชบัญญัติ 13 1990 กรกฎาคม มันชี้ให้เห็นว่า การแนะนำพระราชบัญญัติในความเป็นจริงความเพื่อปราบปรามป้องกัน semitism ในบริบทนี้รัฐ พรรคหมายถึงงบที่ทำโดยแล้วรัฐมนตรีว่าการกระทรวงยุติธรรม นาย Arpaillange ก่อนวุฒิสภากำหนดลักษณะปฏิเสธการดำรงอยู่ของฮอโลคอสต์เป็นนิพจน์สมัยเหยียดและ semitism ป้องกัน8.9 นอกในเขาเห็น 11 1996 กรกฎาคมทำรัฐ พรรคส่งผู้เขียน reiterates อาร์กิวเมนต์ของเขาก่อนหน้านี้ inter alia เขาอีกท้าทายรุ่นกำจัดชาวยิว "ยอมรับ" เนื่องจากการขาดหลักฐาน ในบริบทนี้ เขาหมายถึงตัวความจริงที่ว่าพระราชกฤษฎีกาคำสั่งมรณะที่ไม่เคยพบ และก็มีไม่เคยรับการพิสูจน์ว่ามันเป็นเทคนิคไปฆ่าคนจำนวนมาก asphyxiation ก๊าซ ต่อไปเขาเรียกคืนที่ ชม Auschwitz ทำให้เชื่อได้ว่า ท่อก๊าซพวกเขาดูมีอาหาร ในขณะที่เจ้าหน้าที่รู้ว่า มันเป็นการฟื้นฟู สร้างจุดแตกต่างกว่าเดิมว่า จะได้รับ เขาสรุปว่า เป็นนักประวัติศาสตร์ ความสนใจในข้อเท็จจริง เขาไม่เต็มใจที่จะยอมรับรุ่นดั้งเดิมของเหตุการณ์ และไม่เลือกแต่การแข่งขันก็ได้ตรวจสอบบุญ9.1 การคณะกรรมการสิทธิมนุษยชนได้ถือว่าการสื่อสารปัจจุบันนี้ข้อมูลทั้งหมดที่ทำไปโดยฝ่าย เป็นมันจะต้องทำข้อ 5 วรรค ของโพรโทคอลไม่จำเป็น9.2 คณะกรรมการใช้หมายเหตุ ของสาธารณะการดำเนินในประเทศฝรั่งเศส รวมถึงข้อคิดเห็นเชิงลบโดยสมาชิกรัฐสภาฝรั่งเศสการกระทำ Gayssot และอาร์กิวเมนต์ที่ใส่ไปในประเทศอื่น ส่วนใหญ่ ยุโรปที่สนับสนุน และต่อต้านการแนะนำของ legislations เหมือนกัน9.3 แม้มันไม่ประกวดที่ใช้เงื่อนไขพระราชบัญญัติ Gayssot ซึ่ง ในผลที่เกิดขึ้น ทำให้อาญาท้าบทสรุปและพิพากษาของศาลทหารนานาชาติที่นูเรมเบิร์ก อาจ ภายใต้เงื่อนไขที่แตกต่างกว่าข้อเท็จจริงกรณีทันที การตัดสินใจ หรือวัดเข้ากันกับพันธสัญญา คณะกรรมการจะไม่เรียกวิพากษ์กฎหมายนามธรรมที่บัญญัติ โดยรัฐภาคี งานของคณะกรรมการภายใต้โพรโทคอลไม่จำเป็นจะตรวจว่า เป็นไปตามเงื่อนไขของข้อจำกัดที่กำหนดในสิทธิเสรีภาพในการสื่อสารที่นำมาก่อนที่จะ9.4 มีข้อจำกัดเกี่ยวกับสิทธิเสรีภาพต้อง cumulatively ตรงตามเงื่อนไขต่อไปนี้: ต้อง มีตามกฎหมาย มันต้องระบุจุดมุ่งหมายที่กำหนดในย่อหน้าที่ 3 (ก) และ (ข) ของข้อ 19 และต้องมีความจำเป็นเพื่อให้บรรลุวัตถุประสงค์ถูกต้องตามกฎหมาย9.5 The restriction on the author's freedom of expression was indeed provided by law i.e. the Act of 13 July 1990. It is the constant jurisprudence of the Committee that the restrictive law itself must be in compliance with the provisions of the Covenant. In this regard the Committee concludes, on the basis of the reading of the judgment of the 17th Chambre correctionnelle du Tribunal de grande instance de Paris that the finding of the author's guilt was based on his following two statements: "... I have excellent reasons not to believe in the policy of extermination of Jews or in the magic gas chambers ... I wish to see that 100 per cent of the French citizens realize that the myth of the gas chambers is a dishonest fabrication". His conviction therefore did not encroach upon his right to hold and express an opinion in general, rather the court convicted Mr. Faurisson for having violated the rights and reputation of others. For these reasons the Committee is satisfied that the Gayssot Act, as read, interpreted and applied to the author's case by the French courts, is in compliance with the provisions of the Covenant.9.6 To assess whether the restrictions placed on the author's freedom of expression by his criminal conviction were applied for the purposes provided for by the Covenant, the Committee begins by noting, as it did in its General Comment 10 that the rights for the protection of which restrictions on the freedom of expression are permitted by article 19, paragraph 3, may relate to the interests of other persons or to those of the community as a whole. Since the statements made by the author, read in their full context, were of a nature as to raise or strengthen anti-semitic feelings, the restriction served the respect of the Jewish community to live free from fear of an atmosphere of anti-semitism. The Committee therefore concludes that the restriction of the author's freedom of expression was permissible under article 19, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant.
9.7 Lastly the Committee needs to consider whether the restriction of the author's freedom of expression was necessary. The Committee noted the State party's argument contending that the introduction of the Gayssot Act was intended to serve the struggle against racism and anti-semitism. It also noted the statement of a member of the French Government, the then Minister of Justice, which characterized the denial of the existence of the Holocaust as the principal vehicle for anti-semitism. In the absence in the material before it of any argument undermining the validity of the State party's position as to the necessity of the restriction, the Committee is satisfied that the restriction of Mr. Faurisson's freedom of expression was necessary within the meaning of article 19, paragraph 3, of the Covenant.
10. The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is of the view that the facts as found by the Committee do not reveal a violation by France of article 19, paragraph 3, of the Covenant.
[Adopted in English, French and Spanish, the English text being the original version. Subsequently to be issued also in Arabic, Chinese and Russian as part of the Committee's annual report to the General Assembly.]
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