Meanwhile, MG's cash position was eroding in part because of the large debt the company had accumulated through its huge acquisitions. In February 1993 Schimmelbusch began a divestment program aiming to generate $600 million (U.S.) in cash. MG's financial picture had been further placed in jeopardy, however, by oil-futures hedging positions taken to guard against a rise in oil prices; if oil prices did rise, MGRM would be forced to pay more for the fuel it needed than it would receive from its contractees who were locked into fixed prices. This derivatives strategy was undermined when oil prices, instead of rising, fell starting in the fall of 1993. As a result, on paper at least, the losses were potentially in excess of $1 billion (U.S.). Schimmelbusch needed more cash in order to sustain this strategy until the paper losses evaporated. He sought capital from Deutsche Bank, who then discovered the mounting paper losses, leading to Schimmelbusch's ouster by MG's chairman Ronaldo H. Schmitz, who happened also to serve on Deutsche Bank's board.