system was working and that their reforms and decadent habits could continue unabated. Critics had by and large been marginalized or co-opted, and economic progress, while at times unreliable, seemed to provide a degree of justification for continued Pahlavi rule. By the end of 1977, although the Pahlavi state appeared stable and well entrenched under the shah, growing anger and discontent pervaded most sections of Iranian society.21
Despite massive oil income, long-promised projects for political and economic decentralization stalled while eco- nomic stagnation increased in 1976 and 1977.22 In re- sponse, open opposition to the shah broke out among the middle-class and the remnants of the National Front, stu- dents both inside and outside of Iran, workers, and gueril- las. These groups increasingly voiced their discontent in Islamic terms, which in turn led to their identification as a religious opposition.
Broad religious opposition was itself stoked by the
trained ulama, who resented the Pahlavi regime for con- tinually eroding their power while tolerating the grow- ing influence of Western nations. Among the policies considered hostile toward the ulama, Reza Shah imple- mented qualifying examinations to wear a turban and therefore be recognized as one of the ulama. The shah also secularized legal and educational systems, thus strip- ping the ulama of jobs. Furthermore, the shah unveiled women, opened universities to coeducation, established schools of theology in state universities, including the University of Tehran, put new restrictions on pilgrim- ages abroad, and created a religion corps to go along with the literacy corps for villages, thereby ensuring the teaching of an officially-sanctioned version of religion.23 Through these policies, the shah targeted the power of the ulama and aggressively inserted himself into their previously reserved religious domain.
The shah had a number of reasons for attempting to mar- ginalize the ulama. First, they were becoming a rival cen-