The quantification of the presented insights and results
with regard to the efficacy and efficiency of the various
feebate designs is impossible within the scope of this work.
With the current state of knowledge, we suppose that using
a relative energy efficiency definition which normalizes the
amount of energy needed by a surrogate for car utility
might be a feasible option.
The consequences of using different parameters as policy
targets or as surrogates for car utility are not assessed in
this paper (see E.V.A., 1999; Boardman et al., 2000) but the
principal dilemma is always the same and inherent to the
problem which is outlined in the following.
If cars have a utility for consumers that correlates with
energy consumption, not all consumer segments will be
addressed by an absolute feebate system. In order to
address more consumers, energy consumption needs to be
normalized by a parameter operationalizing utility. Theoretically,
this is achieved best by a parameter which
perfectly corresponds to the vehicles’ utility for the
consumers.
In the choice of this parameter, one faces two problems:
First, consumers are heterogeneous and differ in their
concept of vehicle utility, such that a compromise which
is appropriate for as many consumers as possible would
have to be found. Second, the dilemma inherent to the
problem is that by normalizing energy consumption by
a parameter representing consumers’ utility, one opens
the door to counteracting effects. Consumers might
not stick to the parameter’s value they would prefer
without a rebate system but be willing to change to a
vehicle with a higher value on this parameter especially if
they are rewarded for this change by becoming eligible for
a rebate.
The parameters which are feasible to operationalize car
utility differ in the exact magnitude of undesired counteracting
effects, because they correlate with CO2 emissions
to different degrees and they succeed differently in
operationalizing the utility concepts of heterogeneous
consumers. In order to find the optimal trade-off in this
dilemma, micro-simulation with a highly detailed car fleet
and differentiated consumer segments with their specific
perception of ‘‘car utility’’ seems the most promising
option.
The quantification of the presented insights and resultswith regard to the efficacy and efficiency of the variousfeebate designs is impossible within the scope of this work.With the current state of knowledge, we suppose that usinga relative energy efficiency definition which normalizes theamount of energy needed by a surrogate for car utilitymight be a feasible option.The consequences of using different parameters as policytargets or as surrogates for car utility are not assessed inthis paper (see E.V.A., 1999; Boardman et al., 2000) but theprincipal dilemma is always the same and inherent to theproblem which is outlined in the following.If cars have a utility for consumers that correlates withenergy consumption, not all consumer segments will beaddressed by an absolute feebate system. In order toaddress more consumers, energy consumption needs to benormalized by a parameter operationalizing utility. Theoretically,this is achieved best by a parameter whichperfectly corresponds to the vehicles’ utility for theconsumers.In the choice of this parameter, one faces two problems:First, consumers are heterogeneous and differ in theirconcept of vehicle utility, such that a compromise whichis appropriate for as many consumers as possible wouldhave to be found. Second, the dilemma inherent to theproblem is that by normalizing energy consumption bya parameter representing consumers’ utility, one opensthe door to counteracting effects. Consumers mightnot stick to the parameter’s value they would preferwithout a rebate system but be willing to change to avehicle with a higher value on this parameter especially ifthey are rewarded for this change by becoming eligible fora rebate.The parameters which are feasible to operationalize carutility differ in the exact magnitude of undesired counteractingeffects, because they correlate with CO2 emissionsto different degrees and they succeed differently inoperationalizing the utility concepts of heterogeneousconsumers. In order to find the optimal trade-off in thisdilemma, micro-simulation with a highly detailed car fleetand differentiated consumer segments with their specificperception of ‘‘car utility’’ seems the most promisingoption.
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