There is also much more that actors from outside the Mekong region can do to raise the incentives for cooperation. The Asian Development Bank could more explicitly link the aid funds it channels through the Greater Mekong Subregion program to milestones of intergovernmental dialogue aimed at reaching a river-basin accord among all six riparian governments. The World Bank, which lends more money to China than to any other nation, could introduce similar measures of aid conditionality in its dealings with Beijing. Important precedents were set when the World Bank and IMF tied aid to environmental policy reforms in Cambodia and Indonesia. Admittedly, China has nothing near the aid
dependence of those countries, as it has demonstrated in its persistence in completing the Three Gorges Dam project on the Yangtze in spite of donor resistance. It is unlikely that
such measures would be effective in isolation, but in combination with a concerted
campaign by downstream governments, and with focused international pressure from other
governments and non-governmental organizations within and outside the region, it would
be possible to increase both economic and political incentives on the Chinese government
to reach an accord. Similar pressures could help persuade Thailand and the other MRC
members to reach agreement on rules for water allocation and other contentious matters.