Our default system that automatically grants strong economic rights raises another major problem with using licenses to create alternative schemes that address overprotection. Because of psychological predispositions toward the default, the effort involved in choosing a license, and the lack of a central catalog for recording license grants to the public, even authors unconcerned with economic rights frequently retain them. The bias toward default choices has been recognized and exploited for public benefit in areas such as retirement savsaving and public health. n56 Copyright defaults, however, operate to keep the vast majority of creative works out of the public domain. Except for creators who publish using mechanisms that offer or require license designation, publicizing one's choice of a CC license requires an additional step in the publishing process. The lack of a centralized registry for license designations exacerbates this problem, making it difficult for potential users of CC-licensed works to find and license those works. Although a potential licensee could separately contact the creator and attempt to negotiate a license directly, doing so would introduce an additional transaction cost. Direct contact is especially difficult to secure in the context of Internet-published works because creators often use aliases.