unhealthy acts, and may ultimately find oneself in an unfulfilled and diminished
existence. These results of the act of stealing have a direct relation to
the act; every act pushes one further in some direction of character formation
or another, and further instantiates us in some particular relationship
to the world. External goods, while certainly important, cannot be so easily
guaranteed, except insofar as one offers that guarantee metaphysically by
referring to lives beyond the current one.
Although, promises of personal rebirth aside, there would appear to be
no necessary connection between moral achievement and external rewards,
there is a sense in which moral achievement does often make external rewards
more likely, even if this is never a relation of necessity. This is true
because the more human beings enter the equation, the more likely it is
that a human sense of justice will intervene, drawing some connection between
virtue and reward, or sin and suffering. People who characteristically
treat others with kindness and just consideration are often treated kindly
themselves, although not always. Those who are frequently mean spirited
and selfish are often treated with distain. Honesty in business often pays
off in the form of trusting, faithful customers, while the habit of cheating
customers will often come back to haunt the merchant. These dimensions of
karma and of ethical relations are clear to us, and we are thankful that they
exist. But it would seem that their existence is human and social, rather
than structured into the cosmos.
Therefore, all we can say is that things often work this way, not that
they always do, or that they must. Sometimes unscrupulous businessmen
thrive; on occasion, kindness and honesty go completely unrewarded. These
occurrences make it impossible for us to claim a necessary relation between
moral merit and external forms of reward. Although it is clearly true that
to some extent virtue is its own reward, what we cannot claim is that other
kinds of reward are meted out in the same way. Evidence shows us that they
are not, even if the human exercise of justice often directs external rewards
towards those who are deserving.
Let me summarize the forgoing by saying: how you comport yourself
ethically has at least three ramifications: (1) it shapes your character and
helps determine who or what you become; (2) it helps shape others and the
society in which you live, now and into the future; and (3) it encourages
others to treat you in ways that correspond to your character — they will
often do onto you as you have done onto them, although not always. The
first and second outcomes can be counted as goods internal to ethical action;
our actions do shape us and they do have an effect on the world. The third
is external, that is, contingent, in that it may or may not follow from the