Within this literature, Williams’ (1998) Voice, Trust, and Memory most directly en- gaged the issue of marginalized groups in the language of representation, framing all of the classic issues of representation within the terms of the contemporary debate. “Lib- eral representation” of the kind descended from Locke, though promising formal equal- ity, systematically underrepresents the histor- ically marginalized. By treating individuals as individuals rather than as situated mem- bers of groups, Williams argues, liberal ac- counts of representation fail to conceptual- ize patterns of disadvantage that are based in group situations, and are often replicated within representative institutions. The lib- eral account (at least in its Lockean form) assumes a trustee relationship based on con- vergent majority interests, which does not in fact exist for disadvantaged groups. When such assumptions legitimate electoral sys- tems that simply aggregate votes based on territorial constituency—particularly in the form of single-member districts—they serve to justify and stabilize existing patterns of disadvantage. For this reason, Williams ar- gues, we need to think beyond principal-agent models of representation in which principals are presumed to be formally equal individ- uals. We need to understand representation as a relationship, mediated by group histo- ries and experiences, through which relevant constituencies—particularly those related to fairness—come into existence. Finally, fair representation requires some relationship of trust between individuals and representatives, based on shared experiences, perspectives, and interests, and this is demonstrably not present for historically disadvantaged groups within residence-based systems of representation.
Within this literature, Williams’ (1998) Voice, Trust, and Memory most directly en- gaged the issue of marginalized groups in the language of representation, framing all of the classic issues of representation within the terms of the contemporary debate. “Lib- eral representation” of the kind descended from Locke, though promising formal equal- ity, systematically underrepresents the histor- ically marginalized. By treating individuals as individuals rather than as situated mem- bers of groups, Williams argues, liberal ac- counts of representation fail to conceptual- ize patterns of disadvantage that are based in group situations, and are often replicated within representative institutions. The lib- eral account (at least in its Lockean form) assumes a trustee relationship based on con- vergent majority interests, which does not in fact exist for disadvantaged groups. When such assumptions legitimate electoral sys- tems that simply aggregate votes based on territorial constituency—particularly in the form of single-member districts—they serve to justify and stabilize existing patterns of disadvantage. For this reason, Williams ar- gues, we need to think beyond principal-agent models of representation in which principals are presumed to be formally equal individ- uals. We need to understand representation as a relationship, mediated by group histo- ries and experiences, through which relevant constituencies—particularly those related to fairness—come into existence. Finally, fair representation requires some relationship of trust between individuals and representatives, based on shared experiences, perspectives, and interests, and this is demonstrably not present for historically disadvantaged groups within residence-based systems of representation.
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