In the climate game, defection simply results in more greenhouse
gas emissions, which put the environment as well as today's and future generations in graverdanger. The evolution of the game is the
outcome of our decisions and depends on time. While we can wait
for our climate change knowledge to change our perception about
the game structure, we should be aware of the fact that nature is
not waiting for us. So, the increasing level of GHG emissions exacerbates the situation and may result in changing the structure of the
game to a Chicken game that may have winners and losers. Therefore,
rather than defection as a tactical climate policy to serve national self
interest, “great powers”might be better off reducing emissions and
developing collaborative resolutions to prevent the Chicken game, if
we are not there already. Fortunately, as indicated inAppendix A, cooperative outcomes can be stable for both parties in all“possible”
game structure before occurrence of the Chicken game and during
this game. However, as discussed, the later the cooperative outcome
develops in the game's evolution path, the higher is the cost of cooperation to both parties.