The Proving Ground of Torch
By July 1942, Churchill and Roosevelt had committed to a joint invasion of Vichycontrolled
North Africa by the end of the year.
29 Code-named TORCH, the operation would be
American-led, as the British had been declared collectively persona non grata in French North
Africa following their actions at Mers-el-Kebir and Dakar in 1940, whereas the U.S. maintained
diplomatic relations with the Vichy regime.
30 The invasion was to be accomplished with minimal
violence against the traditionally friendly French,31 but there was concern that the small invasion
force would face disaster if the French resisted strongly,
32
or if the element of surprise failed and
Axis forces amassed in the area. As a result, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower
33
and the Allied
combined military chiefs decided that political maneuvers, psychological warfare, and sabotage
would have to quell French resistance against the invading Allied forces. As the OSS assumed
primary responsibility for covert operations in North Africa under the OSS-SOE agreements
signed in June, this emphasis on subversive warfare paved the way for Donovan’s cadre to play a
major part in the lead-up to and during the invasion.34 TORCH would mark the first American-led offensive in the European and African theaters – and U.S. troops’ first major entry into the
European war – and planners understood that the operation’s relative success or failure would
have a major impact on Allied strategic planning and morale.
35 In this way, TORCH set the stage
had been set for a trial for the OSS; the OSS needed to prove it could act effectively and
independently in support of a military operation and would have the opportunity to do so at a
pivotal moment for U.S. forces and their newly appointed General: Eisenhower
The Proving Ground of TorchBy July 1942, Churchill and Roosevelt had committed to a joint invasion of VichycontrolledNorth Africa by the end of the year.29 Code-named TORCH, the operation would beAmerican-led, as the British had been declared collectively persona non grata in French NorthAfrica following their actions at Mers-el-Kebir and Dakar in 1940, whereas the U.S. maintaineddiplomatic relations with the Vichy regime.30 The invasion was to be accomplished with minimalviolence against the traditionally friendly French,31 but there was concern that the small invasionforce would face disaster if the French resisted strongly,32or if the element of surprise failed andAxis forces amassed in the area. As a result, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower33and the Alliedcombined military chiefs decided that political maneuvers, psychological warfare, and sabotagewould have to quell French resistance against the invading Allied forces. As the OSS assumedprimary responsibility for covert operations in North Africa under the OSS-SOE agreementssigned in June, this emphasis on subversive warfare paved the way for Donovan’s cadre to play amajor part in the lead-up to and during the invasion.34 TORCH would mark the first American-led offensive in the European and African theaters – and U.S. troops’ first major entry into theEuropean war – and planners understood that the operation’s relative success or failure wouldมีผลกระทบสำคัญในการวางแผนเชิงกลยุทธ์พันธมิตรและขวัญ35 วิธีนี้ ไฟฉายตั้งเวทีมีการตั้งค่าสำหรับการทดลองสำหรับ OSS OSS ที่ต้องพิสูจน์ว่ามันสามารถทำหน้าที่ได้อย่างมีประสิทธิภาพ และสนับสนุนปฏิบัติการทางทหารได้อย่างอิสระ และมีโอกาสในการทำงานที่เป็นขณะแปรสำหรับกองทัพสหรัฐอเมริกาและทั่วไปของพวกเขาตกแต่งใหม่: Eisenhower
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