This is not to say that no efforts have been made to achieve better labour standards in a globalizing economy (Lee, 1997a; Standing, 1999; O’Brien, 2000; Rozendaal, 2002). The main site of global governance in respect of worker protection has been the International Labour Organization. Among other things the ILO created a Working Party on the Social Dimension of Trade Liberalization in 1994, launched an agenda of ‘decent work’ in 1999, and published a report on ‘fair globalization’ in 2004 (WCSDG, 2004). More concretely, since the late 1940s the ILO has promotes formalized core labour standards: for example, on freedom of association, the right of collective bargaining, the abolition of forced labour, the prevention of discrimination in employment, and a minimum wage. During the time of accelerated globalization the agency has also greatly increased the number of its other conventions and recommendations and has attracted many more signatories to those instruments. The ILO has in the past decade moreover broadened its conception of work beyond formal labour to cover also informal employment, household labour and the like. For example, the ILO Convention on HomeWork (1996) has sought to protect homeworkers (a largely female sector) with minimum wages and conditions (HomeNet, 1999). An ILO Convention on Migrant Workers is under preparation. However, far from all states have ratified ILO measures, and relatively few states have endorsed recent conventions on subjects such as occupational safety, training, and health services. Moreover, the ILO has lacked means to enforce its codes, in the way that states can mobilize their courts or the WTO can invoke its Dispute Settlement Mechanism.
For their part, transworld trade rules have as yet included little in the way of labour standards. True, revisions to the Generalized System of Preferences effective from 1995 have involved some elements of a social clause (Jordan, 1995: 28). However, attempts in 1996 to incorporate a Working Party on Worker Rights into the WTO were rebuffed, with particularly strong resistance from governments of the NICs. Indeed, many in the South have worried that appeals to ‘social protection’ are a ruse to sustain Northern advantages in world trade (John and Chenoy, 1996). Much like the WTO, the proposed (and for now abandoned) MAI protected capital mobility and property rights, but neglected to safeguard labour rights. Nor have global financial institutions incorporated guarantees regarding working conditions into structural adjustment programmes.
On a macro-regional scale, the European Community adopted a Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights (otherwise known as the Social Charter) in 1989 and included a Social Chapter in the Maastricht Treaty two years later (Purdy, 1997). The Social Charter has enshrined principles such as equal treatment for women at work, works councils, and EU-wide collective bargaining with global companies. Elsewhere the NAFTA agreement of 1994 included a side accord regarding labour rights and standards, although these provisions have had even fewer teeth than the EU measures. In South America MERCOSUR has had a social committee that includes trade union representation, but this organ, too, has been quite marginal.
Elsewhere in suprastate governance the OECD in 2000 upgraded its Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises inter alia to cover core labour standards. In the same year the UN Global Compact for responsible business addressed three of its nine main provisions to labour issues. Again, however, the implementation mechanisms for such arrangements have remained weak. In a word, fully fledged official global labour legislation does not exist.
Private governance arrangements have taken some steps to fill the gaps, inasmuch as labour standards are enshrined in a number of corporate social responsibility schemes (previously discussed in Chapter 6). For example, various firms engaged in global production (especially in clothing, footwear and toy industries) have since the 1990s adopted voluntary codes of conduct on labour practices in their factories. However, CSR-related labour measures have often suffered from limited scope, unambitious targets, loose terms, mixed record of (voluntary) application, lack of independent monitoring and verification, and an absence of clear stakeholder participation and accountability mechanisms. Many CSR exercises have mostly focused on improving market image, particularly when the schemes have been introduced following adverse publicity from consumer campaigns.
In sum, despite some mild countervailing measures from official and private governance, on the whole flexibilization through globalization has had adverse repercussions for security in work. Once again, though, the problems have not lain with globalization as such, but with inclinations to take a laissez-faire approach to working conditions in global capitalism. More proactive policies towards labour standards could produce a more socially sensitive and sustainable globalization.
นี้จะไม่พูดว่า ไม่พยายามทำให้ดีกว่ามาตรฐานแรงงานในเศรษฐกิจ globalizing (ลี 1997a ยืน 1999 โอไบรอัน 2000 Rozendaal, 2002) เว็บไซต์หลักของบรรษัทภิบาลสากลผิดป้องกันผู้ปฏิบัติงานมีองค์กร แรงงาน นานาชาติ ต่าง ๆ ILO สร้างบุคคลทำงานในแบบสังคมมิติของเปิดเสรีการค้าในปี 1994 เปิดวาระการประชุมของ 'งาน' ในปี 1999 และเผยแพร่รายงาน 'โลกาภิวัตน์แฟร์' ในปี 2004 (WCSDG, 2004) มากกว่ารูปธรรม พ.ศ. 2483 ที่ ILO ได้ส่งเสริมมาตรฐานแรงงานหลักอย่างเป็นทาง: ตัวอย่าง ในเสรีภาพในการสมาคม ด้านขวาของเจรจา ยกเลิกแรงงานบังคับ การป้องกันการเลือกปฏิบัติในการจ้างงาน และค่าแรงขั้นต่ำ ในช่วงของโลกาภิวัตน์เร่ง หน่วยงานที่ยังมากขึ้นของข้อตกลงและข้อเสนอแนะอื่น ๆ ของ และได้ดึงดูดมากมายลงนามเพิ่มเติมเพื่อเครื่องมือเหล่านั้น ILO ได้ในทศวรรษนอกจากนี้เป็นต้นมาความคิดของงานมากกว่าแรงงานอย่างเป็นทางการยังเป็นการจ้างงาน แรงงานในครัวเรือน และเช่น ตัวอย่าง อนุสัญญา ILO ว่าด้วยการบ้าน (1996) ได้ขอปกป้อง homeworkers (ภาคผู้หญิงส่วนใหญ่) ค่าจ้างขั้นต่ำและเงื่อนไข (ของ HomeNet, 1999) การอนุสัญญา ILO ว่าด้วยแรงงานข้ามชาติอยู่ภายใต้การเตรียม อย่างไรก็ตาม จากทั้งหมดอเมริกามีสำคัญมาตรการแอล และอเมริกาค่อนข้างน้อยได้รับรองข้อตกลงล่าสุดเหนื่อยอาชีวบริการ ฝึกอบรม สุขภาพ และความปลอดภัย นอกจากนี้ ILO มีขาดหมายถึงการบังคับใช้โค้ด แบบที่อเมริกาสามารถระดมการศาล หรือองค์การสามารถเรียกกลไกการชำระความข้อโต้แย้ง For their part, transworld trade rules have as yet included little in the way of labour standards. True, revisions to the Generalized System of Preferences effective from 1995 have involved some elements of a social clause (Jordan, 1995: 28). However, attempts in 1996 to incorporate a Working Party on Worker Rights into the WTO were rebuffed, with particularly strong resistance from governments of the NICs. Indeed, many in the South have worried that appeals to ‘social protection’ are a ruse to sustain Northern advantages in world trade (John and Chenoy, 1996). Much like the WTO, the proposed (and for now abandoned) MAI protected capital mobility and property rights, but neglected to safeguard labour rights. Nor have global financial institutions incorporated guarantees regarding working conditions into structural adjustment programmes. On a macro-regional scale, the European Community adopted a Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights (otherwise known as the Social Charter) in 1989 and included a Social Chapter in the Maastricht Treaty two years later (Purdy, 1997). The Social Charter has enshrined principles such as equal treatment for women at work, works councils, and EU-wide collective bargaining with global companies. Elsewhere the NAFTA agreement of 1994 included a side accord regarding labour rights and standards, although these provisions have had even fewer teeth than the EU measures. In South America MERCOSUR has had a social committee that includes trade union representation, but this organ, too, has been quite marginal. Elsewhere in suprastate governance the OECD in 2000 upgraded its Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises inter alia to cover core labour standards. In the same year the UN Global Compact for responsible business addressed three of its nine main provisions to labour issues. Again, however, the implementation mechanisms for such arrangements have remained weak. In a word, fully fledged official global labour legislation does not exist. Private governance arrangements have taken some steps to fill the gaps, inasmuch as labour standards are enshrined in a number of corporate social responsibility schemes (previously discussed in Chapter 6). For example, various firms engaged in global production (especially in clothing, footwear and toy industries) have since the 1990s adopted voluntary codes of conduct on labour practices in their factories. However, CSR-related labour measures have often suffered from limited scope, unambitious targets, loose terms, mixed record of (voluntary) application, lack of independent monitoring and verification, and an absence of clear stakeholder participation and accountability mechanisms. Many CSR exercises have mostly focused on improving market image, particularly when the schemes have been introduced following adverse publicity from consumer campaigns. In sum, despite some mild countervailing measures from official and private governance, on the whole flexibilization through globalization has had adverse repercussions for security in work. Once again, though, the problems have not lain with globalization as such, but with inclinations to take a laissez-faire approach to working conditions in global capitalism. More proactive policies towards labour standards could produce a more socially sensitive and sustainable globalization.
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