runs from the stock market to the funds rate, and not
vice versa. Including the stock market variable significantly
improves the empirical fit of the estimated
policy rule.This is most notable toward the end of
the data sample, when the actual federal funds rate
dropped from 6.5% in 2000:Q4 to 1.0% in 2003:Q3.
During this time, the S&P 500 index lost nearly onethird
of its value.The above results reinforce the findings
of Rigobon and Sack (2003), who employ high
frequency data on stock market movements and interest
rate changes from 1985 to 2000.They find that a
5% decrease (increase) in the S&P 500 over the course
of a week raises the probability of a 25-basis-point
interest rate cut (hike) by 64%.
While the data indicate that the Fed reacts directly to
the stock market, statistical regressions do not reveal
the motives behind this behavior. One possibility is
that forward-looking policymakers view movements
in the stock market as useful predictors of future economic
activity.Another possibility is that policymakers
act out of concern for market valuation. In an effort
to divine the Fed’s motives, Hayford and Malliaris
(2001) studied Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) transcripts during Greenspan’s term.The
authors conclude that FOMC members paid significant
attention to the valuation of the stock market
and that, on some occasions, concerns about the stock
market directly influenced the conduct of U.S. monetary
policy. In one notable instance (February 1994),
the transcripts suggest that FOMC members were
worried that raising the funds rate by 50 basis points
might trigger a crash in the stock market, which was
thought to be overvalued at the time. In this case, the
stock market’s possible reaction appeared to act as a constraint on policymakers’ desire to tighten policy
against the threat of rising inflation.
Conclusion
Although central banks control only short-term interest
rates, their ability to influence longer-term rates
and other asset prices is part of the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy.Movements in asset prices
can have important consequences for real output and
inflation. Still, economists do not agree on whether
central banks should react directly to asset prices, or,
more specifically, whether central banks should take
steps to prevent or deflate asset price bubbles.The arguments
against doing so emphasize issues pertaining to
difficulty and risk, but there are strong counterarguments
that favor action when faced with a suspected bubble.
runs from the stock market to the funds rate, and not
vice versa. Including the stock market variable significantly
improves the empirical fit of the estimated
policy rule.This is most notable toward the end of
the data sample, when the actual federal funds rate
dropped from 6.5% in 2000:Q4 to 1.0% in 2003:Q3.
During this time, the S&P 500 index lost nearly onethird
of its value.The above results reinforce the findings
of Rigobon and Sack (2003), who employ high
frequency data on stock market movements and interest
rate changes from 1985 to 2000.They find that a
5% decrease (increase) in the S&P 500 over the course
of a week raises the probability of a 25-basis-point
interest rate cut (hike) by 64%.
While the data indicate that the Fed reacts directly to
the stock market, statistical regressions do not reveal
the motives behind this behavior. One possibility is
that forward-looking policymakers view movements
in the stock market as useful predictors of future economic
activity.Another possibility is that policymakers
act out of concern for market valuation. In an effort
to divine the Fed’s motives, Hayford and Malliaris
(2001) studied Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) transcripts during Greenspan’s term.The
authors conclude that FOMC members paid significant
attention to the valuation of the stock market
and that, on some occasions, concerns about the stock
market directly influenced the conduct of U.S. monetary
policy. In one notable instance (February 1994),
the transcripts suggest that FOMC members were
worried that raising the funds rate by 50 basis points
might trigger a crash in the stock market, which was
thought to be overvalued at the time. In this case, the
stock market’s possible reaction appeared to act as a constraint on policymakers’ desire to tighten policy
against the threat of rising inflation.
Conclusion
Although central banks control only short-term interest
rates, their ability to influence longer-term rates
and other asset prices is part of the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy.Movements in asset prices
can have important consequences for real output and
inflation. Still, economists do not agree on whether
central banks should react directly to asset prices, or,
more specifically, whether central banks should take
steps to prevent or deflate asset price bubbles.The arguments
against doing so emphasize issues pertaining to
difficulty and risk, but there are strong counterarguments
that favor action when faced with a suspected bubble.
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