One reason for official and/or ‘voluntary’ attention to actual or potential safety problems in these product categories is a heightened regulatory regime and public enforcement capacity. In general, it is easier (politically) and more appropriate (economically) to mobilise the political system to enact legislation regulating product safety if there is a high probability of harm, especially if the consequences of a product failure are severe.8 Hence, most countries – including ASEAN Member States – have long had quite strict legislation regulating foods and pharmaceuticals, as well as (more recently) products such as cosmetics, motor vehicles, electrical goods, and products used by infants and children (who are at greater risk of harming themselves than adults).9 Such public regulation incentivises manufacturers to produce safe goods and recall promptly any (potentially) defective goods. They have further incentives from market forces if they are multinational companies trying to maintain a global reputation (such as automobile or high-end electrical goods manufacturers).
However, suppliers have less incentive to provide safe goods if there is low probability of harm, even if the potential harm is high. Attention from the political system and media is lower, resulting in less public regulation and/or actual enforcement by regulators. Thus, the private law system must encourage suppliers to maintain minimum safety standards for general consumer goods, by making it more feasible for consumers to claim compensation for any harm suffered by defective products.10 Accordingly, countries have increasingly imposed strict liability on manufacturers and others for product ‘defects’ (see Table 1), usually defined in terms of a lack of safety that ought to be expected, in addition to or alongside traditional remedies such as the tort of negligence (requiring plaintiffs to prove negligence by the supplier).