Factors (i), (ii), and (iii) directly capture variations in agency costs. For private,
family-controlled companies, the level of agency costs will depend on three factors:
first, the extent to which the owner participates in the management of the business;
second, the proportion of the board of directors who are family members; and third,
the proportion of debt to equity. Each of these is now discussed in turn.
(i) Proportion of the management team who are family members. According to agency theory, demand for external auditing arises in response to a conflict of interest caused by the separation of ownership and control. With an owner who also manages the business, preferences are aligned and the owner/manager bears the full cost of his or her actions (i.e., agency costs minimized). However, when a business employs outsiders to manage, the classic agency problem emerges. In the present study, this conflict is measured by identifying the extent to which nonfamily members are employed to manage the family business (potential range 0-100%) (see Carey and Simnett [1998J). The larger this proportion the faster the rate at which agency costs and hence losses accrue in the absence of auditing.
Factors (i), (ii), and (iii) directly capture variations in agency costs. For private,
family-controlled companies, the level of agency costs will depend on three factors:
first, the extent to which the owner participates in the management of the business;
second, the proportion of the board of directors who are family members; and third,
the proportion of debt to equity. Each of these is now discussed in turn.
(i) Proportion of the management team who are family members. According to agency theory, demand for external auditing arises in response to a conflict of interest caused by the separation of ownership and control. With an owner who also manages the business, preferences are aligned and the owner/manager bears the full cost of his or her actions (i.e., agency costs minimized). However, when a business employs outsiders to manage, the classic agency problem emerges. In the present study, this conflict is measured by identifying the extent to which nonfamily members are employed to manage the family business (potential range 0-100%) (see Carey and Simnett [1998J). The larger this proportion the faster the rate at which agency costs and hence losses accrue in the absence of auditing.
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