but this is only one possible version of civil society and certainly not the only one that can be "derived" from the rights thesis. only if one construes property to be not simple a key rights but the core of the conception of rights-only,that is,if one places the philosophy of possessive individualism at the heart of one's conception of civil society and then reduces civil to bourgeois society-does the rights thesis come to be defined in this way. if,however, one develops a more complex model of civil society,recognizing that it has public and associational components as well as individual, private ones,and if,in addition,one sees that the idea of moral autonomy does not presuppose possessive individualism, then the rights thesis begins to look a bit different.in short, rights do not only secure negative liberty,the autonomy of private,disconnected individuals. they also secure the autonomous (freed from state control) communicative interaction of individuals with one another in the public and private spheres of civil society,as well as a new relation of individuals to the public and the political spheres of society and state(including,of course,citizenship rights).