6. Summary and conclusions
In this study, we provide evidence that recent regulations aimed at increasing the reliability of audited financial
statements ultimately have the unintended consequence of lowering the reliability of the numbers in preliminary releases.
We observe a significant increase in the frequency of firms that issue preliminary earnings prior to the audit report date.
For our sample of 26,731 annual earnings releases over the period 2000–2005, the proportion of firms announcing
preliminary earnings before the audit report date increased from 33% in 2000 to 79% in 2005 due to a significant increase in
average audit report lags (from 46 days in 2000 to 65 days in 2005). These changes are due predominantly to accelerated filers whose auditors had to comply with both AS2 and AS3, although there are still significant changes for the nonaccelerated
filers whose auditors had to comply with only AS3. In response to increased audit report lags, most firms chose
not to alter the timing of their preliminary earnings releases, but, instead, chose to keep the same release date even though
the audit is not yet completed as of that date.
We also examine the factors that explain the decision to announce a timelier, but potentially less reliable number. We
show that a preliminary earnings release that precedes the audit report date is more likely when there is greater investor
demand for timely disclosure and greater accounting and auditing complexity. Regulated firms are also more likely to
release earnings prior to the audit report date. Evidence on the influence of proprietary costs and legal liability is mixed.
Finally, we analyze the consequences of the decision to issue preliminary numbers before the audit report date. We
document a higher frequency of PEA revisions when the preliminary earnings release precedes the audit report date,
consistent with lower earnings reliability. The increase in the frequency of these PEA revisions in the post-regulation
period is again largely attributable to accelerated filers that had to comply with AS2 as well as AS3. Consistent with prior
evidence of a negative market reaction to announcements that previously filed earnings numbers will be restated, we find
evidence of a significant negative market reaction to announcements that the preliminary earnings number differs from
the number that will be reported in the 10-K filing.
We believe these findings are of interest to investors, regulators, and academics. While audits are designed to provide
reasonable assurance that financial statements are free from material misstatements, few archival studies have directly
examined the value of the audit process to public companies. Evidence of a lower incidence of revisions when firms release
preliminary earnings subsequent to the audit report date is consistent with auditing increasing the reliability of
information in the preliminary releases.
6. Summary and conclusionsIn this study, we provide evidence that recent regulations aimed at increasing the reliability of audited financialstatements ultimately have the unintended consequence of lowering the reliability of the numbers in preliminary releases.We observe a significant increase in the frequency of firms that issue preliminary earnings prior to the audit report date.For our sample of 26,731 annual earnings releases over the period 2000–2005, the proportion of firms announcingpreliminary earnings before the audit report date increased from 33% in 2000 to 79% in 2005 due to a significant increase inaverage audit report lags (from 46 days in 2000 to 65 days in 2005). These changes are due predominantly to accelerated filers whose auditors had to comply with both AS2 and AS3, although there are still significant changes for the nonacceleratedfilers whose auditors had to comply with only AS3. In response to increased audit report lags, most firms chosenot to alter the timing of their preliminary earnings releases, but, instead, chose to keep the same release date even thoughthe audit is not yet completed as of that date.We also examine the factors that explain the decision to announce a timelier, but potentially less reliable number. Weshow that a preliminary earnings release that precedes the audit report date is more likely when there is greater investordemand for timely disclosure and greater accounting and auditing complexity. Regulated firms are also more likely torelease earnings prior to the audit report date. Evidence on the influence of proprietary costs and legal liability is mixed.Finally, we analyze the consequences of the decision to issue preliminary numbers before the audit report date. Wedocument a higher frequency of PEA revisions when the preliminary earnings release precedes the audit report date,consistent with lower earnings reliability. The increase in the frequency of these PEA revisions in the post-regulationperiod is again largely attributable to accelerated filers that had to comply with AS2 as well as AS3. Consistent with priorevidence of a negative market reaction to announcements that previously filed earnings numbers will be restated, we findevidence of a significant negative market reaction to announcements that the preliminary earnings number differs fromthe number that will be reported in the 10-K filing.We believe these findings are of interest to investors, regulators, and academics. While audits are designed to providereasonable assurance that financial statements are free from material misstatements, few archival studies have directlyexamined the value of the audit process to public companies. Evidence of a lower incidence of revisions when firms releasepreliminary earnings subsequent to the audit report date is consistent with auditing increasing the reliability ofinformation in the preliminary releases.
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