Furthermore, the Soviet 20th Party Congress in February '
1956 issued a number of theoretical pronouncemen$s which were
patently unsuited to Vietnamese needs. The Lao Dong Party
resolution commenting on these innovations revealed ill-disguised
distaste for Khrushchev's dicta on the preventability
of war (noting instead the need for struggle and vigilance
against imperialist war plotting) and on peaceful accession -r
to power. In a country like Vietnam, the Lao Dong resolution
clearly implied, it was necessary "to prepare the proletariat
well in advance. . .for the inevitable armed struggle for power. I'
Khrushchev's slashing attack on Stalin and the "cult of Dersonality"
was greeted coolly at the outset by the DRV, a& by
the Chinese, and by the end of 1957 Soviet destalinization was
being publicly blamed for much of the "pessimism and skegticism"
which had infected the Lao Dong Party.