The dependent variable is the change in stock market value in dollar terms (as
measured by the International Finance Corporation's Investable Index) from
the end of 1996 to the lowest point of 1998 and to the end of 1998. A comparison
in dollars is appealing because this is how most international investors and the
IFC evaluate stock market performance. Obviously, the dollar value of markets
is heavily in#uenced by exchange rate movements. However, the correlation is
not one-to-one. Table 3 shows the values of this index.
Our regression analysis using macroeconomic variables shows very little
correlation with stock market performance (Table 6). We report results for four
variables that represent the key macroeconomic issues: the current account at
the end of 1996, the level of reserves at the end of 1996, the debt-to-GDP ratio at
the end of 1996, and the budget de"cit in 1996. None of the "rst three variables
are signi"cant in any speci"cation. Import coverage and other measures of debt are also not signi"cant. Table 6 reports results using the lowest point of 1998 (see
Table 3 for the month in each case); none of the results change signi"cantly if we
use the end of 1998.
A larger initial budget de"cit is correlated with less depreciation. This implies
that countries with a larger budget surplus (or smaller budget de"cit) at the end
of 1996 had worse stock market performance in the crisis. For example, a 1%
`bettera budget implies a 5% lower stock market from the end of 1996 to the
lowest point in 1998.
In contrast, the results using our legal variables are much stronger (see
Table 7). The judicial e$ciency variable is not signi"cant, but the other legal
environment variables are signi"cant in most speci"cations.
Corruption, plotted against stock market performance in Fig. 5, is signi"cant
both by itself and with the East Asia dummy. The regression coe$cient implies
that a one-point improvement in the corruption index is associated with 7.6%
better cumulative stock market performance. The adjusted R-squared is 0.09
without the East Asia dummy. Corruption becomes more signi"cant and has
a larger coe$cient when we control for reserves, but it is insigni"cant when we
include both reserves and the East Asia dummy.
The rule of law variable is signi"cant in three out of four speci"cations. It is
not signi"cant by itself but is signi"cant at the 5% level when we also control for
reserves. This coe$cient implies that a one point better score on the rule of law
index is associated with ten percentage points' better stock market performance.
The coe$cient declines to just over seven and the signi"cance level falls to 10%
when we control for East Asia and when we include both the East Asia dummy
and reserves.
The corporate governance variable is signi"cant until we bring in the East Asia
dummy. The coe$cient is over 12 and the R-squared rises to 0.22 when we include
reserves. Interestingly, with the East Asia dummy included, reserves have the right
sign: an $10 billion of reserves implies a 4% better stock market performance.
However, this is the only signi"cant stock market result for reserves.
Neither anti-director rights nor accounting standards are signi"cant in the
stock market regressions, even if we multiply these measures with the indices
representing legal institutions. Creditor rights actually have a signi"cant negative
coe$cient in the stock market regression for 1997}98, implying that countries
with better protection for creditors experience worse stock market
performance, although this coe$cient loses its signi"cance when we include the
East Asia dummy.
6.3. Robustness checks
Using December 1998 as the ending point for our sample does not change the
essence of the results. The macroeconomic variables are still not signi"cant, with
the exception of the "scal policy variable, which consistently has the wrong sign.
The same three legal variables remain robustly signi"cant.
Controlling for money growth in 1996 does not a!ect the results.
Corruption and corporate governance remain signi"cant, as does the rule
of law (if we also include reserves). Money growth is not signi"cant in any
speci"cation. The same results hold if we control for money growth while
dropping Turkey.
If we control for log GDP per capita and reserves in the corruption regression,
the independent variables are jointly signi"cant, but none of the variables are
individually signi"cant. In the same regression for rule of law, only the level of
reserves is signi"cant (but with a negative sign.) Judicial e$ciency, the Flemings
corporate governance measure, and the measure of anti-director rights are not
signi"cant. Log GDP per capita is signi"cant in several speci"cations; given that it
is highly correlated with the general legal environment, it could be picking up the
strength of some institutions (although probably not anti-director rights).
The stock market results for measures of investor protection are more
dependent on outliers than is the case for our exchange rate results. In particular,
if we drop Indonesia, the rule of law result is unchanged, but corruption and
the corporate governance variable lose their signi"cance. However, it should be
kept in mind that we are missing data on two countries in all the stock market
regressions. Russia, a country with very weak investor protection, had a large
fall in its stock market (on the order of Indonesia) but joined the IFC index only
in November 1997, so we do not have the requisite stock market information.
Russia's IFC Investable Index fell 84.2% in 1998 (IFC, 1999); the change in this
index for 1997 is not available. The Czech Republic has struggled to establish
investor protection, but only by 1997 was beginning to institute a reasonable set
of safeguards (Glaeser et al., 2001). Its stock market (measured by the IFC's
Investable Index) fell 22% in 1997 and only 7.3% in 1998. If Russia and the
Czech Republic were included, our results would be stronger and the dependence
on Indonesia reduced.
Our results show that ex post returns including the crash of 1997}98 are lower
where institutions are weaker and where there is, as a result, more risk. This is
not inconsistent with the argument that ex ante expected returns in the stock
market should be higher where governance is weaker. We do not have evidence
about expected returns before the crisis in these markets