Information impactedness, when the information deficiency favors the agent, can also
create monitoring and coordination costs (Abrahamson & Park, 1994). Often, these asymmetries
exist because the information is costly for principals to obtain or principals simply do not have
access to the same information as the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). As Munter and Kren’s (1995) study
of Fortune 500 firms indicate, when information is too costly to obtain, a monitoring system will
be employed. Bureaucracy costs are also increased by a higher need for monitoring when the tasks
of the agent are not standardized or are complicated. This deduction is supported by Welbourne,
Balkin, and Gomez-Mejia’s (1995) study of 221 employees in two firms, which indicated that
monitoring costs increase with complexity, as does Kulkarni and Fiet’s (2007) study of 139 firms
during the peak of restructuring.