he thereby negates the belief that a collection of aggregates makes up a single self (BCA
8: 99). In brief, ―there is no possessor of pain‖ (BCA 8: 101–102), that is, there is no
irreducible ―I‖ and therefore, no reasonable grounds for differentiating between my
suffering and yours. Consequently, Śāntideva proposes that all suffering without
exception must be eliminated. The notion of identification with all beings emerges in the
following lines:
To abolish my own I must abolish all,
Otherwise, I, like beings, must stay in pain (BCA 8: 103).
This clearly resonates with the deep ecologist‘s project of adopting the interests and
needs of other beings as one‘s own. Śāntideva here has taken on the affliction of other
beings, because his own ‗pain‘ cannot be eliminated without eliminating that of all
beings. It is only the habit of a lifetime, he suggests, that makes us identify with our
particular body and our troubles, and he proposes that, with practice, we could come to
regard others‘ bodies and problems as ours too (BCA 8:110–111). Śāntideva suggests that
just as we consider our limbs to be inalienable parts of ourselves, we could learn to
regard all sentient beings as the ―inalienable limbs of life‖ (BCA 8: 113). Again, there is a
striking resemblance between this idea and the deep ecologist‘s notion of an ―expanded
self.‖
Although the deep ecologists‘ concept of identification is very similar to the
Mahāyāna Buddhist‘s idea of solicitude, as we have seen, the reasons for endorsing it, in
each case, are completely different. The appeal to emptiness and to the fact that no self
can be found anywhere allows the Mahāyāna Buddhist to avoid the problem of whether it
is the similarity or the difference between us and other beings that allows and promotes
identification. It also sidesteps the issue, which eco-feminists have brought up, of
whether incorporating other beings into our sense of self is an appropriate way of relating
to them, or if it is not, rather, simply arrogant of us to refuse to respect boundaries, and to
assume that we know what every other being needs (Plumwood 1997, 178). Basing
solicitude on emptiness, rather than on a feeling of identity, will also enable us to avoid
the contradictions inherent in statements such as John Livingstone‘s, ―all that is in the
universe is not merely mine; it is me. And I shall defend myself‖ (cited in Plumwood
he thereby negates the belief that a collection of aggregates makes up a single self (BCA
8: 99). In brief, ―there is no possessor of pain‖ (BCA 8: 101–102), that is, there is no
irreducible ―I‖ and therefore, no reasonable grounds for differentiating between my
suffering and yours. Consequently, Śāntideva proposes that all suffering without
exception must be eliminated. The notion of identification with all beings emerges in the
following lines:
To abolish my own I must abolish all,
Otherwise, I, like beings, must stay in pain (BCA 8: 103).
This clearly resonates with the deep ecologist‘s project of adopting the interests and
needs of other beings as one‘s own. Śāntideva here has taken on the affliction of other
beings, because his own ‗pain‘ cannot be eliminated without eliminating that of all
beings. It is only the habit of a lifetime, he suggests, that makes us identify with our
particular body and our troubles, and he proposes that, with practice, we could come to
regard others‘ bodies and problems as ours too (BCA 8:110–111). Śāntideva suggests that
just as we consider our limbs to be inalienable parts of ourselves, we could learn to
regard all sentient beings as the ―inalienable limbs of life‖ (BCA 8: 113). Again, there is a
striking resemblance between this idea and the deep ecologist‘s notion of an ―expanded
self.‖
Although the deep ecologists‘ concept of identification is very similar to the
Mahāyāna Buddhist‘s idea of solicitude, as we have seen, the reasons for endorsing it, in
each case, are completely different. The appeal to emptiness and to the fact that no self
can be found anywhere allows the Mahāyāna Buddhist to avoid the problem of whether it
is the similarity or the difference between us and other beings that allows and promotes
identification. It also sidesteps the issue, which eco-feminists have brought up, of
whether incorporating other beings into our sense of self is an appropriate way of relating
to them, or if it is not, rather, simply arrogant of us to refuse to respect boundaries, and to
assume that we know what every other being needs (Plumwood 1997, 178). Basing
solicitude on emptiness, rather than on a feeling of identity, will also enable us to avoid
the contradictions inherent in statements such as John Livingstone‘s, ―all that is in the
universe is not merely mine; it is me. And I shall defend myself‖ (cited in Plumwood
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