The primary contribution of the current study is the identification of creditor rights as an important factor in shaping
corporate capital structure across countries. Our findings consistently suggest that creditor protection—and in particular, its
component related to managers' and shareholders' concerns about retaining control—has a negative effect on the amount of
debt financing. This evidence points to the importance of managers' and shareholders' risk-avoiding incentives (namely,
demand-side forces) in driving the relation between creditor rights and capital structure. In this regard, our evidence is related
to Acharya et al. (2011), who document that strong creditor protection leads managers to make risk-reducing decisions in
mergers and acquisitions. The current study, together with Acharya et al. (2011), suggests that strong creditor protection can
lead to value-decreasing corporate decisions, as strong creditor protection induces managers and shareholders to make
decisions that minimize risk.