The diversity in services provided and roles played by patrons within individual households means that this debate will continue beyond this paper. There is no clear-cut hero or villain in a patroneclient relationship in our case study. Each remains dependent upon the other. The short-term contributions to livelihood
security through food or credit in a developing country are of course crucial to the everyday survival of fishing households until alternative social security solutions are found. Yet, the long-term effects of patroneclient relationships on coastal household vulnerability and natural resource management on Zanzibar
remain unknown. The lesson from this research for coastal governance is that managers and practitioners must appreciate the importance of patroneclient relationships in defining how coastal communities depend on these forms of social security back-ups, how deeply rooted that dependence can be, and what the consequences for marine resources are. The example of Paje highlights
that alternative forms of organization amenable to government support are feasible. Crona et al. (2010) already underlined the value of middlemen as ‘knowledge-brokers’ and we firmly support this idea. Patrons, even exploitative patrons, are not to be demonized by coastal management. Instead their priorities and influence can be transformed into a useful buy-in for coastal managers. While their position as important providers of social security for fishing
households is likely to cause unsustainable resource use, their locally-relevant knowledge and integration into society is a management opportunity not to be missed.