Information that needs protection is contained in hard copy, electronic form, and equipment. The protected material handled by embassies consists mostly of instruction, reports, and code material. An information’s contents determine whether it is classified; the grade of classification depends on the estimated danger that disclosure would bring to bear on the country’s security, defense, or international relations. If the compromise of information would damage the national interests in an exceptionally grave manner, the material must be classified as TOP SECRET; in case of possible serious damage, the classification must be SECRET; in case of possible significant damage, the classification must be CONFIDENTIAL. If the compromise of information would be likely to affect the national interests in an adverse manner, the classification RESTRICTED must be use. The manual lays down guidelines for classification, the necessary clearance levels, manual transmission, and manual storage. It also allows the electronic transmission and storage for all grades of classified information, provided the information is encrypted. New Zealand’s manual also warns against over classification. Indeed, over classification seems to be a problem for some foreign services. On the other hand, embassies of other foreign services are not inclined to over classify documents: The higher a document is classified the more tiresome it is to handle it. The same can be true with ICT-supported communication. When the Canadian foreign service demanded that each single official had to classify his own documents classification levels went down. It was too complicated to use the procedures for classified material.
Those officials who handle classified material must have the necessary security clearances. The security of information is enhanced if classified material is only accessible to those who need to know it. These principles are generally applied by all governments. Especially sensitive to breaches of security regulations is the cable room that contains the embassy’s cipher system. The ciphers and the machines that apply them are highly classified material and therefore need rigorous and constant protection. It is the duty of the administrative section to ensure the security of these installations.
It is safe to assume that classified material is occasionally mishandled. The Indyk case provides some insight into this matter. In September 2000, Martin S. Indyk, US Ambassador to Israel, was relieved of his post and his security clearance was lifted, because he had allegedly mishandled classified materials. He was accused of having used as unclassified computer for writing classified documents and of having taken classified documents home to work on them. Apparently, this practice was common among US diplomats at that time. During the subsequent security crackdown the promotion of more than 200 senior State Department officials was frozen Finally, on October 11, 2000 Ambassador Indyk’s security clearance and his status as Ambassador to Israel were restored. Lapses of security regulations must be fought, but perhaps not in the drastic way the State Department handled the Indyk case. As long as no secrets are disclosed, a policy of reminding the foreign service staff of correct procedures might do.