The typical framework employed to evaluate
crop insurance decisions utilizes the standard
assumption that farmers maximize expected
utility of end-of-period wealth by choosing
production factors, including crop insurance,
subject to physical and technical constraints
(Smith and Baquet; Mahul; Goodwin; Coble
et al.). In general, the use of crop insurance
involves trading a certain fixed premium payment
in exchange for the payment of a contingent
indemnity. Relative to an uninsured case,
the contingent payment truncates, or significantly
modifies crop revenues below an indemnified
level, and the payment of the premium
shifts the revenue distribution downward by
the amount of the premium.
The conceptual model developed below formalizes
the role of financial leverage and risk
attitudes in the evaluation of crop insurance
decisions. The approach assumes different
farmers each calculate their reservation insurance
premiums for use of crop insurance under
their unique business risks, financial risks, and
risk aversion; recognizing that the effects of
crop insurance on producers’ distributions of
future returns are specific to each producer. To
compare different returns distributions, each
farmer considers the certainty equivalent of
random returns under each insurance option