These polar extremes reflect contrasting economic settings in real life.
There are many examples of simple exchange institutions that permit low cost
transacting under the former conditions. But institutions that permit low cost
transacting and producing in a world of specialization and division of labor
require solving the problems of human cooperation under the latter conditions.
It takes resources to define and enforce exchange agreements. Even if
everyone had the same objective function (like maximizing the firm's profits),
transacting would take substantial resources; but in the context of individual
wealth-maximizing behavior and asymmetric information about the valuable
attributes of what is being exchanged (or the performance of agents), transaction
costs are a critical determinant of economic performance. Institutions and
the effectiveness of enforcement (together with the technology employed)
determine the cost of transacting. Effective institutions raise the benefits of
cooperative solutions or the costs of defection, to use game theoretic terms. In
transaction cost terms, institutions reduce transaction and production costs per
exchange so that the potential gains from trade are realizeable. Both political
and economic institutions are essential parts of an effective institutional matrix.
The major focus of the literature on institutions and transaction costs has
been on institutions as efficient solutions to problems of organization in a
competitive framework (Williamson, 1975; 1985). Thus market exchange, franchising,
or vertical integration are conceived in this literature as efficient
solutions to the complex problems confronting entrepreneurs under various
competitive conditions. Valuable as this work has been, such an approach
assumes away the central concern of this essay: to explain the varied performance
of economies both over time and in the current world.
How does an economy achieve the efficient, competitive markets assumed
in the foregoing approach? The formal economic constraints or property rights
are specified and enforced by political institutions, and the literature simply
takes those as a given. But economic history is overwhelmingly a story of
economies that failed to produce a set of economic rules of the game (with
enforcement) that induce sustained economic growth. The central issue of
economic history and of economic development is to account for the evolution
of political and economic institutions that create an economic environment that
induces increasing productivity.
These polar extremes reflect contrasting economic settings in real life.There are many examples of simple exchange institutions that permit low costtransacting under the former conditions. But institutions that permit low costtransacting and producing in a world of specialization and division of laborrequire solving the problems of human cooperation under the latter conditions.It takes resources to define and enforce exchange agreements. Even ifeveryone had the same objective function (like maximizing the firm's profits),transacting would take substantial resources; but in the context of individualwealth-maximizing behavior and asymmetric information about the valuableattributes of what is being exchanged (or the performance of agents), transactioncosts are a critical determinant of economic performance. Institutions andthe effectiveness of enforcement (together with the technology employed)determine the cost of transacting. Effective institutions raise the benefits ofcooperative solutions or the costs of defection, to use game theoretic terms. Intransaction cost terms, institutions reduce transaction and production costs perexchange so that the potential gains from trade are realizeable. Both politicaland economic institutions are essential parts of an effective institutional matrix.The major focus of the literature on institutions and transaction costs hasbeen on institutions as efficient solutions to problems of organization in acompetitive framework (Williamson, 1975; 1985). Thus market exchange, franchising,
or vertical integration are conceived in this literature as efficient
solutions to the complex problems confronting entrepreneurs under various
competitive conditions. Valuable as this work has been, such an approach
assumes away the central concern of this essay: to explain the varied performance
of economies both over time and in the current world.
How does an economy achieve the efficient, competitive markets assumed
in the foregoing approach? The formal economic constraints or property rights
are specified and enforced by political institutions, and the literature simply
takes those as a given. But economic history is overwhelmingly a story of
economies that failed to produce a set of economic rules of the game (with
enforcement) that induce sustained economic growth. The central issue of
economic history and of economic development is to account for the evolution
of political and economic institutions that create an economic environment that
induces increasing productivity.
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..
