Moreover, even in private companies, as well as in public ones, management’s bonuses
might be earnings-based. Under this perspective, executive compensation might represent
relevant incentives for managers to manipulate earnings, whereas shareholders have a clear
interest in obtaining non-manipulated numbers. Finally, in settings where earnings reported
in financial reports are the basis for determining tax obligation, management/shareholder
would like to pursue tax saving objectives, whereas fiscal authorities have an interest to
obtain high-quality accounting numbers. Even if it is clear that incentives to manipulate
earnings are present in private companies, it is not evident yet whether these incentives are
stronger or weaker compared with listed companies.
Moreover, even in private companies, as well as in public ones, management’s bonusesmight be earnings-based. Under this perspective, executive compensation might representrelevant incentives for managers to manipulate earnings, whereas shareholders have a clearinterest in obtaining non-manipulated numbers. Finally, in settings where earnings reportedin financial reports are the basis for determining tax obligation, management/shareholderwould like to pursue tax saving objectives, whereas fiscal authorities have an interest toobtain high-quality accounting numbers. Even if it is clear that incentives to manipulateearnings are present in private companies, it is not evident yet whether these incentives arestronger or weaker compared with listed companies.
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