about the public also believe in the integrity of elections, versus a bare
majority of 51 per cent among those least confident in parties. Certainly, it is
a challenge to the very system of representative democracy when such
doubts exist among a significant part of the electorate.
At least indirectly, there is evidence that such popular doubts about
political parties are fuelling demands for reforms in the structure of electoral
politics. Growing public disenchantment with political parties led to
electoral reforms in Italy, Japan and New Zealand during the 1990s
(Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). There are mounting pressures for electoral
reform in Britain as well, and the current Dutch government is committed to
restructuring that nation’s electoral system. In the United States,
dissatisfaction with parties and politicians stimulated term-limit reforms in
several states. Frankly, we doubt whether these changes in election
procedures will fully address the public’s scepticism. Initial survey evidence
suggests that the reforms in Japan and New Zealand, for instance, did not
restore public confidence in parties (Dalton 2004: ch. 8). In addition, the fact
that distrust in parties extends across different electoral systems and party
configurations suggests that institutional reform will not resolve this
problem. Rather, the urge for reform illustrates the public’s underlying
negativity toward parties and the system of party-led government.
Without addressing the issue of causality, it is clear that party support is
part of a syndrome of general evaluations of the institutions of representative
democracy and the overall evaluations of the democratic process. Thus, it
would be a mistake to treat these measures of party support as distinct from
other measures of political support. A negative image of parties is linked to
negative images of other elements of the democratic process