TABLE 2 IN SOMEWHERE HERE
Some taxes are levied on a daily basis, others biannually or yearly. In addition,
some fees and licences are imposed on individual ‘transactions’. For instance,
sand fee is levied in tons per load of sand, and hunting licences are levied per
animal (varying with the type of game in question). Market fees are in general
levied daily on people selling their goods at market places. However, some
councils offer the option of paying an annual fee. Agricultural cess is levied on the sale of major crops such as maize, rice, coffee, tea, cotton, cashew nuts, sweetpotatoes,
etc., and on livestock. Generally, the cess is levied on physical units
(weight or volume) rather than value. Large variations in cess rates exist between
various crops. Furthermore, there are often large variations in rates between
councils. This is also the case for other taxes, including the head tax ‘development
levy’ and the bicycle tax, which are levied on an annual basis.
In 1998, local government own revenues corresponded to 5.8 per cent of total
central government tax revenues for 1997/98. This share has been almost
unchanged since 1996.
However, tax revenues per capita differ substantially
between councils (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 1999). In 1995, it ranged from TSh 344
per person above the age of 18 in Lindi District Council, to TSh 1,541 in Mbinga
DC. Furthermore, there are large variations between wards and villages within
councils.
The tax administration
Local government tax collection is the responsibility of the council staff, and is
completely separated from the central government. In district councils it is
organised around three levels, namely the council headquarters, the wards and the
village levels. At the sub-village level, the kitongoji leader is responsible for
mobilising taxpayers.6
At the council headquarters the responsibility for tax collection rests with the
council treasury, headed by the District Treasurer (DT). At the ward levels, the
responsibility rests with the office of the Ward Executive Officer (WEO). The
WEO also handles developmental issues and law-and-order functions at that level.
As such they have access to the local militia. In wards with greater revenue
potential there will also be a ward revenue collector (WRC) to support the WEO.
At the village level, the responsibility rests with the office of the village executive
officer (VEO). The VEO is also responsible for village developmental issues.
These officers are nominated to their position by the village governments, but
appointed and employed by the council. The system of nomination ensures that
the VEOs come from the villages of their domicile. At the sub-village level the
kitongoji leader is responsible for mobilising taxpayers.
In practice, however, organisation of tax collection may vary between councils. For
instance, in Kilosa DC the village level has been excluded from collection, which
has been taken over by the ward level. According to the district treasury staff, this
was due to incentive problems connected with tax collection at the village level.
One problem arises from the presence of two principals for the VEOs, i.e., the
village government as the nominating authority and the council as the appointing
and employing authority, leading to divided loyalty. Another problem arises from
VEOs operating within their areas of domicile. Lack of arm’s-length relationship
between tax collectors and taxpayers introduces economics of affection into village tax collection. In many villages the local politicians resist to mobilise people
to pay taxes due to the unpopularity of taxation. In yet other councils, villagers are
employed as agents of the council to collect development levy and other minor
revenue sources. In Lindi DC, for instance, the council pays a commission of 20
per cent of the total revenue collected to the village collectors.7
Most taxes are paid in cash. One exception is for civil servants whose head tax
(‘development levy’) is withheld from their salaries. For others, development levy
can be paid during office hours at any of the revenue collecting centres mentioned
above. The statutory voluntary period is from January 1 up to September 30. All
tax payments made after the deadline are subject to a penalty equivalent to 50
percent of the tax rate. As from October 1 to December 31 development levy
payment ‘campaigns’ are conducted, organised by the ward office and using state
organs, i.e., the local militia and judiciary, to ensure compliance. Defaulters may
be visited in their homes, and people may be required to show tax receipts at
roadblocks. Non-compliers who are caught are brought to the primary court or
ward offices. Due to widespread resistance, tax campaigns for development levy
in some councils (involving the militia) may start several months before the
voluntary (and statutory) payment period expires. The treasury staff argues that by
waiting too long after the harvest period taxpayers’ would have spent their money
and nothing would be left for taxation.
Market fees and crop cesses are, in general, collected at the selling points and
markets. However, ‘big buyers’ of cessable goods (often co-operatives) are
expected to pay directly to the council treasury. The buyer then pays the council in
advance based on the strength of the figures estimated by the co-operative officer
from Ministry of Agriculture. If the figures are not accepted by the ‘big buyer’,
negotiations are opened. Most licences and some fees have to be paid at the
respective offices at the district headquarters. Licences are often issued on an
annual or biannual basis. The council may carry out spot-checks of entrepreneurs
and businesses to control that licences are paid.
Roadblocks are frequently used to control taxpayers. For instance, barriers are
used to control buyers of certain crops like cashew nuts in the Coastal Region.
The buyer has to produce receipts before they are allowed to transport the
purchase outside the district. Similar checkpoints are used to control people for
‘development levy’ and bicycle tax. Roadblocks may also be used to collect
market fees, implying that the fees have to be paid before the goods enter the
market place.
Administrative costs
One consequence of the present local revenue system is the high costs of tax
administration.8
In Kilosa DC, for instance, the wage bill represented about 80 per
cent of total own revenues reported in 1995.
The corresponding figure for 1996
was about 64 per cent. However, when disaggregated by wards, large variations
are observed.10 In some wards in Kilosa DC, the administrative costs are higher
than the revenues remitted to the council (Figure 1). For instance, in Lumbiji ward
the wage bill was 2.75 times higher than the revenues reported in 1996. The
corresponding figures for Mwatani and Ulaya wards were 1.92 and 1.44,
respectively. In Kidodi ward the wage bill corresponded to 18 per cent of the
reported revenues from the ward. In Kibaha DC we also found large differences
between the wards (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 1999).
TABLE 2 IN SOMEWHERE HERESome taxes are levied on a daily basis, others biannually or yearly. In addition,some fees and licences are imposed on individual ‘transactions’. For instance,sand fee is levied in tons per load of sand, and hunting licences are levied peranimal (varying with the type of game in question). Market fees are in generallevied daily on people selling their goods at market places. However, somecouncils offer the option of paying an annual fee. Agricultural cess is levied on the sale of major crops such as maize, rice, coffee, tea, cotton, cashew nuts, sweetpotatoes,etc., and on livestock. Generally, the cess is levied on physical units(weight or volume) rather than value. Large variations in cess rates exist betweenvarious crops. Furthermore, there are often large variations in rates betweencouncils. This is also the case for other taxes, including the head tax ‘developmentlevy’ and the bicycle tax, which are levied on an annual basis.In 1998, local government own revenues corresponded to 5.8 per cent of totalcentral government tax revenues for 1997/98. This share has been almostunchanged since 1996. However, tax revenues per capita differ substantiallybetween councils (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 1999). In 1995, it ranged from TSh 344per person above the age of 18 in Lindi District Council, to TSh 1,541 in MbingaDC. Furthermore, there are large variations between wards and villages withincouncils. The tax administrationLocal government tax collection is the responsibility of the council staff, and iscompletely separated from the central government. In district councils it isorganised around three levels, namely the council headquarters, the wards and thevillage levels. At the sub-village level, the kitongoji leader is responsible formobilising taxpayers.6At the council headquarters the responsibility for tax collection rests with thecouncil treasury, headed by the District Treasurer (DT). At the ward levels, theresponsibility rests with the office of the Ward Executive Officer (WEO). TheWEO also handles developmental issues and law-and-order functions at that level.As such they have access to the local militia. In wards with greater revenuepotential there will also be a ward revenue collector (WRC) to support the WEO.At the village level, the responsibility rests with the office of the village executiveofficer (VEO). The VEO is also responsible for village developmental issues.These officers are nominated to their position by the village governments, butappointed and employed by the council. The system of nomination ensures thatthe VEOs come from the villages of their domicile. At the sub-village level thekitongoji leader is responsible for mobilising taxpayers.In practice, however, organisation of tax collection may vary between councils. Forinstance, in Kilosa DC the village level has been excluded from collection, whichhas been taken over by the ward level. According to the district treasury staff, thiswas due to incentive problems connected with tax collection at the village level.One problem arises from the presence of two principals for the VEOs, i.e., thevillage government as the nominating authority and the council as the appointingand employing authority, leading to divided loyalty. Another problem arises fromVEOs operating within their areas of domicile. Lack of arm’s-length relationshipbetween tax collectors and taxpayers introduces economics of affection into village tax collection. In many villages the local politicians resist to mobilise peopleto pay taxes due to the unpopularity of taxation. In yet other councils, villagers areemployed as agents of the council to collect development levy and other minorrevenue sources. In Lindi DC, for instance, the council pays a commission of 20per cent of the total revenue collected to the village collectors.7Most taxes are paid in cash. One exception is for civil servants whose head tax(‘development levy’) is withheld from their salaries. For others, development levycan be paid during office hours at any of the revenue collecting centres mentionedabove. The statutory voluntary period is from January 1 up to September 30. Alltax payments made after the deadline are subject to a penalty equivalent to 50percent of the tax rate. As from October 1 to December 31 development levypayment ‘campaigns’ are conducted, organised by the ward office and using state
organs, i.e., the local militia and judiciary, to ensure compliance. Defaulters may
be visited in their homes, and people may be required to show tax receipts at
roadblocks. Non-compliers who are caught are brought to the primary court or
ward offices. Due to widespread resistance, tax campaigns for development levy
in some councils (involving the militia) may start several months before the
voluntary (and statutory) payment period expires. The treasury staff argues that by
waiting too long after the harvest period taxpayers’ would have spent their money
and nothing would be left for taxation.
Market fees and crop cesses are, in general, collected at the selling points and
markets. However, ‘big buyers’ of cessable goods (often co-operatives) are
expected to pay directly to the council treasury. The buyer then pays the council in
advance based on the strength of the figures estimated by the co-operative officer
from Ministry of Agriculture. If the figures are not accepted by the ‘big buyer’,
negotiations are opened. Most licences and some fees have to be paid at the
respective offices at the district headquarters. Licences are often issued on an
annual or biannual basis. The council may carry out spot-checks of entrepreneurs
and businesses to control that licences are paid.
Roadblocks are frequently used to control taxpayers. For instance, barriers are
used to control buyers of certain crops like cashew nuts in the Coastal Region.
The buyer has to produce receipts before they are allowed to transport the
purchase outside the district. Similar checkpoints are used to control people for
‘development levy’ and bicycle tax. Roadblocks may also be used to collect
market fees, implying that the fees have to be paid before the goods enter the
market place.
Administrative costs
One consequence of the present local revenue system is the high costs of tax
administration.8
In Kilosa DC, for instance, the wage bill represented about 80 per
cent of total own revenues reported in 1995.
The corresponding figure for 1996
was about 64 per cent. However, when disaggregated by wards, large variations
are observed.10 In some wards in Kilosa DC, the administrative costs are higher
than the revenues remitted to the council (Figure 1). For instance, in Lumbiji ward
the wage bill was 2.75 times higher than the revenues reported in 1996. The
corresponding figures for Mwatani and Ulaya wards were 1.92 and 1.44,
respectively. In Kidodi ward the wage bill corresponded to 18 per cent of the
reported revenues from the ward. In Kibaha DC we also found large differences
between the wards (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 1999).
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..
