Foreword
The Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB) set up to investigate the Buncefield
explosion and fire completed its work in 2008 and published its final report.1 At that time
it was not possible to disclose all the information about the underlying causation upon
which many of its recommendations were based as criminal legal proceedings were
still in progress. However, now that these proceedings have concluded, this information
can be brought together so that everyone in major hazard industries – not just those
involved in fuel storage – can learn from this incident, understand what went wrong, and
take away lessons that are relevant to them. Although five years have passed since the
incident, the information and advice in this report is still highly relevant today.
The explosion and fire at the Buncefield oil storage depot in 2005 was a significant event.
As part of the work of the MIIB, the Health and Safety Executive and the Environment
Agency, as the Competent Authority in England and Wales for the regulation of major
accident hazards, carried out a joint investigation into the cause of the incident.
The Competent Authority took action to ensure that those responsible for the incident
were held to account in the criminal courts, and I emphasise our determination that,
where we think it appropriate, the Competent Authority will continue to take the necessary
action to ensure operators of major hazard sites manage them properly. When passing
sentence on the defendants at St Albans Crown Court on 16 July 2010, the Judge, the
Hon Mr Justice Calvert-Smith, commented that cost cutting per se was not put forward
as a major feature of the prosecution case, but the failings had more to do with slackness,
inefficiency and a more-or-less complacent approach to matters of safety.
I therefore ask all in the major hazard industries to look carefully at your own operations
in the light of the management and technical failings that lay behind this incident, and the
important developments in the meantime.
Since the incident, the Competent Authority, industry and trade unions have worked
together to drive forward high standards at fuel storage sites. This has resulted in
agreement on improved standards of safety and environmental protection for all UK
sites storing large volumes of gasoline and to systematically upgrade sites to meet these
standards, with progress monitored by the Competent Authority as part of its regulatory
programmes. This work has also established a set of process safety leadership principles
for top-level engagement in all businesses involved with significant risks to people and
the environment – see www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/response.htm.
The Competent Authority has also improved its approach to regulating onshore major
hazards in the light of ten years of operating the COMAH regime including incidents such
as Buncefield. More information on the Competent Authority’s remodelling programme is
at www.hse.gov.uk/comah/remodelling/index.htm.
Major industrial incidents are thankfully rare and I trust this report will contribute to
making them even rarer.