New Thinking and Western Europe
When Gorbachev assumed power in March 1985, he inherited a European policy in deep crisis. In Western Europe, the Soviet Union was isolated, its policy stalled as a result of the INF debacle. In Eastern Europe, the USSR found itself at odds with its allies, many of which increasingly sought to exploit the Soviet preoccupation with internal problems—particularly the succession issue—to expand their room for maneuver. At the same time, Gorbachev was confronted with a mounting economic crisis that threatened to undermine the Soviet Union’s ability to remain a major military and political power.
Gorbachev’s report to the 27th Party Congress reflected of these insights. He noted that the economic, financial, and technological superiority that the United States had exercised in the
past had been “put to a serious test” and that Western Europe and Japan were challenging the United States even in areas where it had traditionally exerted undisputed hegemony, such as high technology. Many sectors of West European public opinion, he claimed, “had begun to openly discuss whether U.S. policy coincides with Western Europe’s notions about its own security and whether the U.S. was going too far in its claims to leadership”. While admitting that the economic , political, military and other common interests of the three centers of power (the United States, Japan, and Western Europe) could not be expected to break up in the near future, he warned that the United States “should not expect unquestioning obedience of its allies” and predicted that “contradictions” within the capitalist camp were likely to increase as a result of the emergence of new centers of power.