What then explains the observed link between the timing of devaluations and the onset of
crisis? In our view, the devaluations have reflected two critical facts. First, in cases of Mexico,
Thailand, Korea, and Russia, they reflected the depletion of foreign exchange reserves. These
countries abandoned their currency pegs only when they had substantially run out of reserves.
Thus, as the devaluations occurred, these countries were in an exceedingly vulnerable financial
position, with very high levels of short-term debt in comparison with (depleted) foreign exchange
reserves. Second, the devaluations, though unavoidable once the reserves were deplected,
amounted to a broken promise. The Abroken promise@ therefore became a focal point for
financial panic.
In our perspective, it was the pegged exchange rates preceding the devaluation, rather
than the currency devaluations themselves, which should be considered the more important cause
of the crisis. When pegged rates become overvalued, the pegged rate system in effect forces
countries to deplete their foreign exchange reserves, in a vain defense of the currency peg. When
that ultimately happens, the countries are also forced to break their commitments on the exchange
rate, by devaluing the currency (or allowing it to depreciate). The combination of depleted
reserves plus the broken promises leaves the country very vulnerable to panic. With a floating
rate system, countries can maintain their foreign reserves and thereby maintain a defense against
financial panic. Foreign creditors see that the central bank keeps enough reserves to repay shortterm
debts, thereby eliminating the possibility of a self-fulfilling creditor panic. Also, governments
are not forced to break their word when international or domestic events for a change in market
exchange rates.