In meeting this challenge, those who advocate the theory of representative bureaucracy begin by seeking an answer to the same question posed by Wilson: Why do bureaucrats do what they do? Specifically, the focus is on explaining the behavior of bureaucrats when they exercise discretionary authority. Generally, it is assumed that bureaucrats are rational actors in the sense that they pursue self-interested goals when faced with discretionary choices. Proponents of representative bureaucracy argue that the goals driving behavior are supplied by the individual values of the decision maker. Thus, “if the administrative apparatus makes political decisions, and if bureaucracy as a whole has the same values as the American people as a whole, then the decisions made by the bureaucracy will be similar to the decisions made if the entire American public passed on the issues. . . . If values are similar, rational decisions made so as to maximize these values will also be similar” (Meier , ). This suggests that bureaucratic power can be harnessed to diverse and representative social interests even though the orthodox organizational arrangements of public administration are insulated from the basic processes and values of democracy. If the ranks of the civil service reflect the diverse interests and values of society, bureaucracy becomes a representative “fourth branch of government” with a legitimate basis for exercising power in a democratic system.