There are some theories which do not take the form of being institutionally fundamentalist in the way that Gauthier's theory is, but which share the priority of chosen institutions over the nature of the outcomes and realizations. For example, when Robert Nozick argues for the necessity, for reasons of justice, of guaranteeing individual liberties, including the rights of property ownership, free exchange, free transfer and free inheritance, he makes the institutions needed for these rights (the legal as well as the economic framework) essential requirements of his vision of a just society. And he is ready to leave matters in the hands of these institutions rather than calling for any revision based on an assessment of outcomes (no 'patterning' of out¬come is allowed in his theory, at least in its pure form). Formally, there is still a difference between valuing the institutions themselves and seeing an institution as being essential to justice because of its being necessary for the realization of something else, such as the 'rights' of people, as in the Nozickian system. The distinction is, however, rather formal, and it would not be entirely misleading to see Nozick’s theory to be derivatively fundamentalist about institutions.