The public, meanwhile, held the government responsible for most of their suffering and called upon it to undertake radical political and economic reforms. When the government failed to carry out these reforms, the people called for the government to resign. Having witnessed the regime’s brutal actions against its opponents, however, most Burmese thought of themselves as utterly powerless vis-à-vis the government. “
The major problem we encountered,” notes a movement leader, “was that most people we tried to mobilize did not think they could do much to change the situation” (interview, August 2002 ).SMOs therefore needed to convince the public that it was possible to alter conditions through collective action. Although they did not collaborate, this leader continued, BCP-affiliated and independent SMOs alike tried to rouse people out of their faintheartedness and bring them “ into action in conflictual settings” by informing them of the “diagnosis and remedy for existing forms of suffering.” Antigovernment pamphlets distributed by various SMOs blamed all the suffering of the people on government corruption. And, these pamphlets added, replacing the authoritarian government with a democratic one through collective action was a good way of eradicating all the
suffering. The government, of course, responded harshly. A number of political activists who were arrested while engaging in antigovernment activities were not only jailed without trial but tortured. Given these political constraints, many people, among them several political activists, were not optimistic about the possibility of a nationwide antigovernment movement.
Political developments in the first half of 1988, however, gave activists the confidence they needed to persist in their antigovernment activities. At the special party
congress held in July, Ne Win, chairman of the Burma Socialist Program Party,
stepped down after proposing a referendum on whether Burma should adopt a multiparty system. To many people’s surprise, the congress voted down Ne Win’s proposal (Yitri 1989:547). For the first time in the history of the BSPP, an irreconcilable split occurred between the party ’s chairman, Ne Win, and his comrades.
Until then, the congress had been a mere rubber stamp, and party members had
meekly followed Ne Win’s instructions. Those who defied him were fired immediately. This is why Burma-watchers jokingly remarked that the BSPP did not have a chairman, the chairman had a party. This1988 split was not a division between soft-liners and hard-liners, however, as in China or eastern Europe. Instead, it was due to the congress’s fear of losing the privileges they had acquired. Although party delegates officially asked Ne Win to remain in power, he prudently chose not to stay.
Both the opposition and the general public sensed the opening up of opportunity. Burmese people found Ne Win’s disappearance from active politics especially significant, because none of his potential successors seemed as capable as he.
The public, meanwhile, held the government responsible for most of their suffering and called upon it to undertake radical political and economic reforms. When the government failed to carry out these reforms, the people called for the government to resign. Having witnessed the regime’s brutal actions against its opponents, however, most Burmese thought of themselves as utterly powerless vis-à-vis the government. “
The major problem we encountered,” notes a movement leader, “was that most people we tried to mobilize did not think they could do much to change the situation” (interview, August 2002 ).SMOs therefore needed to convince the public that it was possible to alter conditions through collective action. Although they did not collaborate, this leader continued, BCP-affiliated and independent SMOs alike tried to rouse people out of their faintheartedness and bring them “ into action in conflictual settings” by informing them of the “diagnosis and remedy for existing forms of suffering.” Antigovernment pamphlets distributed by various SMOs blamed all the suffering of the people on government corruption. And, these pamphlets added, replacing the authoritarian government with a democratic one through collective action was a good way of eradicating all the
suffering. The government, of course, responded harshly. A number of political activists who were arrested while engaging in antigovernment activities were not only jailed without trial but tortured. Given these political constraints, many people, among them several political activists, were not optimistic about the possibility of a nationwide antigovernment movement.
Political developments in the first half of 1988, however, gave activists the confidence they needed to persist in their antigovernment activities. At the special party
congress held in July, Ne Win, chairman of the Burma Socialist Program Party,
stepped down after proposing a referendum on whether Burma should adopt a multiparty system. To many people’s surprise, the congress voted down Ne Win’s proposal (Yitri 1989:547). For the first time in the history of the BSPP, an irreconcilable split occurred between the party ’s chairman, Ne Win, and his comrades.
Until then, the congress had been a mere rubber stamp, and party members had
meekly followed Ne Win’s instructions. Those who defied him were fired immediately. This is why Burma-watchers jokingly remarked that the BSPP did not have a chairman, the chairman had a party. This1988 split was not a division between soft-liners and hard-liners, however, as in China or eastern Europe. Instead, it was due to the congress’s fear of losing the privileges they had acquired. Although party delegates officially asked Ne Win to remain in power, he prudently chose not to stay.
Both the opposition and the general public sensed the opening up of opportunity. Burmese people found Ne Win’s disappearance from active politics especially significant, because none of his potential successors seemed as capable as he.
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