the sovereignty o the peopl and as this arir lea undemoor ture of t work it becomen obvinim dia cannot productively be understood kind merather constitutional state i line second reserva the democratic that bars the road to any attempt itt actualizing the l'hihioply Right today is of a mainly methodological kind and refors to the whole. It is structure of the argument in the text wed and the steps in Hegel's reasoning b but judged only in relation to the appropriate pa of his Logic, the Logic has become totally inco its ontological conception of spirit, "Therefore, it seemh advis a quarry for brilliant individual idea able to treat the te is rather than making a futile atto to reconstruct the theory a an integral who yolitical and It was probably these two reservatio contrib other methodological, that made the mos signific tion to the decline in importance of the Philosophy of Right in the well as last few decades the argumt shall in support of his ow normative, that Hegel is able to lden behind the contested conception of ethical life"rom concept of the state, if this elements of his methodology and his crude characterization bears any resemblance to the reception of the work over the years then any attempt at reactualiza tion is faced right at the outset with the choice between two alternatives: we must either c eize the two objections directly and show them up as mere misunderstandings through a new or we must criticize interpretation of the Philosophy of Rig them indirectly by demonstrating the irrelevane to any ally productive reappropriation of the treatise. Thus, while the first, "direct" strategy would aim to actuali the Philosophy of Right according to its own methodological standards and at