From the middle of 2006 there was a dramatic rise in mortgage delinquencies across the breadth
of the United States. A foreclosure epidemic had been triggered. House prices had initially
peaked and then begun a steep decline. At the same time interest rates had continued to rise.
When the introductory period of adjustable rate mortgages (issued mostly to the subprime2
mortgage market) ended and the low interest rate ceased, mortgage payments ballooned.
Mortgage refinancing for homeowners became either more expensive or impossible. In the
period from July 2006 to July 2007 the rate of foreclosures (home repossessions) had risen by
93% (RealityTrac), as homeowners continued to default on their mortgages.3 In the same year
this number grew to 1.5 million before it began to decline (Bernanke 2008b). As a result of the
foreclosures, securities backed with subprime mortgages widely held by investors lost most
of their value. In addition, as mortgage losses mounted, investors questioned the reliability of
the credit ratings, especially those of structured credit products.4 Since many investors had not
performed independent valuations of these often complex instruments, the loss in confidence
in the credit ratings led to a sharp decline in the willingness of investors to purchase these
products. Liquidity dried up. Prices fell. Many of these investors had assumed significant
debt burdens to invest in these securities. Rather than using the boom period to build their
reserves, investors (banks) increased their risk exposure as evidenced by higher debt to equity
ratios, also known as financial leverage. As a result, investors did not have a sufficiently large
financial cushion to absorb extensive loan defaults when they arose. The consequence was a
large decline in the capital of many US banks. However, the problems were not restricted to
US banks, as outlined in Box 4.1.
From the middle of 2006 there was a dramatic rise in mortgage delinquencies across the breadthof the United States. A foreclosure epidemic had been triggered. House prices had initiallypeaked and then begun a steep decline. At the same time interest rates had continued to rise.When the introductory period of adjustable rate mortgages (issued mostly to the subprime2mortgage market) ended and the low interest rate ceased, mortgage payments ballooned.Mortgage refinancing for homeowners became either more expensive or impossible. In theperiod from July 2006 to July 2007 the rate of foreclosures (home repossessions) had risen by93% (RealityTrac), as homeowners continued to default on their mortgages.3 In the same yearthis number grew to 1.5 million before it began to decline (Bernanke 2008b). As a result of theforeclosures, securities backed with subprime mortgages widely held by investors lost mostof their value. In addition, as mortgage losses mounted, investors questioned the reliability ofthe credit ratings, especially those of structured credit products.4 Since many investors had notperformed independent valuations of these often complex instruments, the loss in confidencein the credit ratings led to a sharp decline in the willingness of investors to purchase theseproducts. Liquidity dried up. Prices fell. Many of these investors had assumed significantdebt burdens to invest in these securities. Rather than using the boom period to build theirreserves, investors (banks) increased their risk exposure as evidenced by higher debt to equityratios, also known as financial leverage. As a result, investors did not have a sufficiently largefinancial cushion to absorb extensive loan defaults when they arose. The consequence was alarge decline in the capital of many US banks. However, the problems were not restricted toUS banks, as outlined in Box 4.1.
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