On the opposite side are the fishermen involved in the purse
seine and Grand Sole trawl segments, showing a positive attitude
towards a system of ITQs. The main reason they give is that this
instrument would allow them to better organize its activity and
obtain an additional income in the event of cessation of activity.We
can also observe a preference for non-transferable annual quotas
for the coastal longline. Of the reasons given by those surveyed for
rejecting a system of effort, the suitability of quotas to better control
(directly) the state of the marine resource stands out; and the
main reason they give to opt for a non-transferable system is the
fear of an excessive concentration of quota in the largest
companies.
Therefore, from the results obtained, it can be concluded that
fishermen in (non-Spanish) European waters show, in general, a
greater preference for a system of ITQs. In any case, the results of
the estimations of the logistic regression model are heterogeneous
insofar as attitudes more in favour of a system of effort or quotas in
terms basically of vessel characteristics are concerned, that is, the
characteristics of the vessel and the type of fishing gear used. By
comparing the fishers' preferences with economic data shown in
Table 3, we can see that those fishing segments generating lower
net profits (as a percentage of the value of landings) show a
favourable attitude towards the implementation of ITQs (Grand
Sole trawl and purse seine). And, however, the segments that show
a higher rate of net profit on landing value are more in favour of a
system of effort (artisanal, surface longline and Grand Sole
longline).