While local governments and ministries compete for national investment funds, the competition is constrained by the availability of funding at localities, since virtually all projects implemented by local governments require counterpart funding, the proportions of which vary by sector and by region. For example, school construction requires a onethird
contribution from local governments, and for low-cost housing the central input is a flat rate of CNY 300 per square metre for the central provinces and CNY 400 for the western provinces.10 Eligibility for application usually requires proof of funding availability from the local government. To be eligible for bank credit, the banks also require proof of requisite own funding in the form of equity or paid-in capital (usually 25-35%).
With the fiscal stimulus programme, the available pool of central funding was vastly expanded, but the goal for quick implementation of the ambitious investment programme required the NDRC to be especially vigilant in ensuring that projects would be allocated only to local governments that have sufficient funds to meet co-financing needs. From the
outset, the worry was that with three-quarters of the projects assigned to localities, local governments would struggle to meet this burden of counterpart funding.
Under the climate of urgency that characterised the period from late 2008 through 2009, every effort was made to facilitate local government applications for projects. First, the government introduced several new measures to make it easier for local
governments to meet the co-financing requirements. On 17 March 2009, the State Council approved a special CNY 200 billion treasury bond issue by the Ministry of Finance on behalf of local governments, and stipulated an accelerated disbursement of the funds to the provinces (Han and Luo, 2009a). The ostensible purpose of this bond issue was to be a first
step toward allowing local governments to raise debt for funding capital investments. Until an institutional framework is installed to monitor and control local debt issue, the government has chosen to issue the debt centrally, through the Ministry of Finance, but under the names of recipient provinces. Ministry spokespersons explained that these funds “should mainly be used in public infrastructural projects for the provision of public goods … and not for enhancing recurrent expenditures” (Han and Luo, 2009b).
Second, in a more radical move, the government officially endorsed the use of local government financial platforms (see Box 1) and other means of raising debt. On 24 March 2009, a document was jointly issued by the People’s Bank of China and the China Banking Regulatory Commission, calling for “supporting localities with appropriate conditions to organise and build financial platforms, issue corporate debt and mediumterm notes and other financial products, to broaden the channels of funding for providing counterpart funds for central government investment projects”.11 Third, the Ministry of Finance relaxed the standards on what is eligible as counterpart funds to qualify for stimulus projects, specifying that local governments can use the following sources: budgetary resources, land revenues, proceeds from local bonds issued
by the Ministry of Finance, funds raised by local financial platforms, and all other resources at the discretion of local governments (Ministry of Finance, 2009). In fact, all of these changes had been outlined by Zhang Ping, Director of the NDRC, at a press conference during the National People’s Congress meetings in March 2009, signaling a consensus approval by policy makers at the highest level of government (Zhang, 2009). Altogether, these changes greatly expanded the space for local governments, and a dynamic was set up whereby local governments competed fiercely for stimulus
investment projects, which represented an unprecedented windfall of funding opportunities for all manner of pet local projects. As a legacy of the planned economy, all local governments and line ministries have medium and long-term plans with project pipelines. Ready or not, many of these projects were quickly rolled out and brought forward, and new projects were hastily put together to meet the calls for new spending in environmental and green technology areas. Within less than a month of the announcement of the stimulus package, local governments, in aggregate, had proposed a staggering total of CNY 18 trillion in investment projects. Soon after, the figure rose further to CNY 25 trillion for the first 18 provinces reporting their plans (Huo et al., 2009).
While local governments and ministries compete for national investment funds, the competition is constrained by the availability of funding at localities, since virtually all projects implemented by local governments require counterpart funding, the proportions of which vary by sector and by region. For example, school construction requires a onethird
contribution from local governments, and for low-cost housing the central input is a flat rate of CNY 300 per square metre for the central provinces and CNY 400 for the western provinces.10 Eligibility for application usually requires proof of funding availability from the local government. To be eligible for bank credit, the banks also require proof of requisite own funding in the form of equity or paid-in capital (usually 25-35%).
With the fiscal stimulus programme, the available pool of central funding was vastly expanded, but the goal for quick implementation of the ambitious investment programme required the NDRC to be especially vigilant in ensuring that projects would be allocated only to local governments that have sufficient funds to meet co-financing needs. From the
outset, the worry was that with three-quarters of the projects assigned to localities, local governments would struggle to meet this burden of counterpart funding.
Under the climate of urgency that characterised the period from late 2008 through 2009, every effort was made to facilitate local government applications for projects. First, the government introduced several new measures to make it easier for local
governments to meet the co-financing requirements. On 17 March 2009, the State Council approved a special CNY 200 billion treasury bond issue by the Ministry of Finance on behalf of local governments, and stipulated an accelerated disbursement of the funds to the provinces (Han and Luo, 2009a). The ostensible purpose of this bond issue was to be a first
step toward allowing local governments to raise debt for funding capital investments. Until an institutional framework is installed to monitor and control local debt issue, the government has chosen to issue the debt centrally, through the Ministry of Finance, but under the names of recipient provinces. Ministry spokespersons explained that these funds “should mainly be used in public infrastructural projects for the provision of public goods … and not for enhancing recurrent expenditures” (Han and Luo, 2009b).
Second, in a more radical move, the government officially endorsed the use of local government financial platforms (see Box 1) and other means of raising debt. On 24 March 2009, a document was jointly issued by the People’s Bank of China and the China Banking Regulatory Commission, calling for “supporting localities with appropriate conditions to organise and build financial platforms, issue corporate debt and mediumterm notes and other financial products, to broaden the channels of funding for providing counterpart funds for central government investment projects”.11 Third, the Ministry of Finance relaxed the standards on what is eligible as counterpart funds to qualify for stimulus projects, specifying that local governments can use the following sources: budgetary resources, land revenues, proceeds from local bonds issued
by the Ministry of Finance, funds raised by local financial platforms, and all other resources at the discretion of local governments (Ministry of Finance, 2009). In fact, all of these changes had been outlined by Zhang Ping, Director of the NDRC, at a press conference during the National People’s Congress meetings in March 2009, signaling a consensus approval by policy makers at the highest level of government (Zhang, 2009). Altogether, these changes greatly expanded the space for local governments, and a dynamic was set up whereby local governments competed fiercely for stimulus
investment projects, which represented an unprecedented windfall of funding opportunities for all manner of pet local projects. As a legacy of the planned economy, all local governments and line ministries have medium and long-term plans with project pipelines. Ready or not, many of these projects were quickly rolled out and brought forward, and new projects were hastily put together to meet the calls for new spending in environmental and green technology areas. Within less than a month of the announcement of the stimulus package, local governments, in aggregate, had proposed a staggering total of CNY 18 trillion in investment projects. Soon after, the figure rose further to CNY 25 trillion for the first 18 provinces reporting their plans (Huo et al., 2009).
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